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Relational Contracts of Adhesion 
David A. Hoffman† 
Not all digital fine print exculpates liability: some exhorts users to perform 
before the consumer relationship has soured. We promise to choose strong passwords 
(and hold them private); to behave civilly on social networks; to refrain from stream-
ing shows and sports; and to avoid reverse-engineering code (or, worse, deploying 
deadly bots). In short, consumers are apparently regulated by digital fine print, 
though it’s universally assumed that we don’t read it and, even if we did, that we’ll 
never be sued for failing to perform. 
On reflection, this ordinary phenomenon is perplexing. Why would firms per-
sist in deploying uncommunicative behavioral spurs? The conventional answer is 
that fine print acts as an option, drafted by dull, guild-captured lawyers. Through 
investigation of several sharing-economy firms and discussions with a variety of 
lawyers in this space, I show that this account is incomplete. Indeed, I identify and 
explore examples of fine print from sharing-economy firms that seem intended to 
actually communicate with and manage users. 
The drafters of these clauses claim that they successfully deployed the fine print 
by trading on their brands and identities and by giving up on certain exculpatory 
defenses. I argue that the resulting terms may point toward a new form of relational 
contracting, taking on attributes of both mass adhesion contracts and longer-term 
deals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consumer contract theory is myopically focused on the un-
read fine print.1 Because consumers don’t read their contracts,2 
firms can make “hidden” terms worse without lowering prices.3 At 
best, the platonic consumer contract is read by exactly two people, 
both lawyers: the drafter curating it from the carcasses of past 
agreements4 and the plaintiff’s counsel, immediately before ex-
plaining to an injured client that her case is hopeless.5 Yet per-
versely, when judges and juries evaluate terms ex post, they 
 
 1 For the modern classic treatment, see Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz, The No-
Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 Stan L Rev 545, 558–60 (2014). 
 2 See, for example, Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David R. 
Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form 
Contracts, 43 J Legal Stud 1, 19 (2014) (finding that, in a study of visits to software retail-
ers’ websites, consumers accessed end-user license agreements (EULAs) 0.08 percent of 
the time). 
 3 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J Inst & 
Theoretical Econ 94, 113–14 (2012) (finding that exposure to a one-sided term in a 
software license agreement has no effect on the likelihood of purchasing the product in 
question); Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U Chi L 
Rev 1263, 1315–17 (2011) (explaining the concern that insurance companies “exploit[ ] 
consumer ignorance to ratchet back coverage” without corresponding discounts). 
 4 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and 
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 NYU L Rev 240, 247 (2013) (dis-
cussing the process of consumer contract creation, through which in-house counsel is best 
positioned to revise boilerplate language and language taken from other firms). 
 5 In reality, many consumers complain to firms without the benefit of counsel (be-
cause the stakes of the dispute are low). In such instances, the corporation may create its 
own idiosyncratic dispute resolution system. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as 
Courthouse, 33 Yale J Reg 547, 558–66 (2016) (explaining predominant aspects of corpo-
rate dispute resolution systems); Lisa Bernstein and Hagay Volvovsky, Not What You 
Wanted to Know: The Real Deal and the Paper Deal in Consumer Contracts—Comment on 
the Work of Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 11 Jerusalem Rev Legal Stud 128, 130–32 (2015) 
(explaining that companies’ actual practices for resolving consumer complaints can differ 
2018] Relational Contracts of Adhesion 1397 
 
blame consumers for failing to exercise care and hold them to 
their deals.6 The result is a legitimacy crisis that generates much 
modern contracts scholarship.7 
But even as this account has settled into the new, cynical, 
conventional wisdom, a new form is arising. The modern con-
sumer experience now includes participation in the creation of 
goods and services.8 Firms enlist consumers in building intellec-
tual property. They ask us to review goods and services, and use 
 
from their formal policies in ways that have the effect of avoiding litigation); Jason Scott 
Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts 
Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 Mich L Rev 857, 
865 (2006) (highlighting corporations’ use of employee discretion in departing from formal 
contractual terms). 
 6 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 
Iowa L Rev 1745, 1764–65 (2014) (presenting results of an experiment in which subjects 
often blamed consumers for failing to read bad terms). 
 7 See, for example, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing 
Standard Terms, 103 Cornell L Rev 117, 124–26 (2017) (discussing various doctrinal ap-
proaches to the no-reading problem); David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How 
Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91 NYU L Rev 1595, 1597 (2016) (characterizing 
digital contracts as sterile and frequently the subject of satire); Nathan B. Oman, The 
Dignity of Commerce: Markets and the Moral Foundations of Contract Law 134–59 
(Chicago 2016) (considering arguments regarding consent for consumer boilerplate and 
concluding that policing on substance, not process, is desirable); Omri Ben-Shahar, Book 
Review, Regulating through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 Mich L Rev 883, 900–01 (2014) 
(highlighting distributive problems with “protective policies” meant to replace boilerplate 
contracts); Oren Bar-Gill and Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 
97 Cornell L Rev 967, 1003 (2012) (advocating for new and better disclosure regimes, in-
cluding aggregated fee information, which the consumer can better assess); Zev J. Eigen, 
Experimental Evidence of the Relationship between Reading the Fine Print and 
Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J Inst & Theoretical Econ 124, 134 (2012) (cit-
ing the “low stakes of the exchange” as one of the “typical” explanations of low readership); 
Victoria C. Plaut and Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological 
Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 L & Hum Behav 293, 
305–06 (2012) (exploring the relationship between lack of readership and assent to con-
tractual provisions); Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U Pa L Rev 647, 704–11 (2011) (exploring the problem of no-reading); Oren 
Bar-Gill and Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S Cal L Rev 1, 19–26 (2010) (articulating 
problems caused by unilateral modification clauses); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 
98 Nw U L Rev 1373, 1417–20 (2004) (advocating for consumer-friendly modifications to 
credit card fee disclosure policies). 
 8 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans Invented Law and 
How to Reinvent It for a Complex Global Economy 154 (Oxford 2017) (discussing the com-
plexity of monitoring copying of digital information, such as music and videos, when the 
“boundary between who is a supplier and who is a consumer dissolves,” and how relaxed 
restrictions on copying can enable consumers to become creators). The question of labeling 
users of sharing economy sites as “consumers” is intensely contested. See Ryan Calo and 
Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 Colum L Rev 
1623, 1660 (2017) (arguing that labeling drivers as consumers is part of Uber’s strategy of 
exploiting them). 
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those reviews in driving future sales. Platforms match users with 
each other, seeking to disintermediate established transportation 
and distribution networks.9 Overall, consumer agency, not passiv-
ity, is the rhetoric, if not the reality, of the “sharing economy.”10 
The evolution of consumers into participants has implica-
tions for contract law. Indeed, it is contract that makes the trans-
mutation possible. Our economy is now shaped in part by the suc-
cess and failure of terms that don’t just exculpate firms from 
liability, but also express the drafters’ hopes about how users will 
behave. In part through the fine print, firms may aim to influence 
consumers’ performance before the parties’ interests become ad-
verse. That is, consumer contracts can’t be described as merely 
containing unfair and defensive hidden terms: they also contain 
a set of instructions, what I call “precatory fine print.”11 
Precatory fine print is distinctive from its aversive and defen-
sive cousin. Unlike a clause defeating class action practice or one 
disclaiming consequential damages, precatory terms are not pri-
marily intended to have legal effect. Indeed, in the rare instances 
that firms seek to enforce clauses in the courts of law, they get 
into trouble.12 Consider the example of streaming media online. 
Firms often use boilerplate to try to extend their intellectual prop-
erty rights—for example, by prohibiting consumers from assert-
ing fair use under circumstances in which the prevailing law 
 
 9 In this Article, I generally use “consumer” to refer to users of platform economy 
sites, though those individuals may be either buyers or sellers. See Hadfield, Rules for a 
Flat World at 154 (cited in note 8). 
 10 The literature on the sharing economy is vast. For a useful recent survey, see Calo 
and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1641–45 (cited in note 8) (describing the promise of 
the sharing economy). 
 11 The use of the term “precatory” to describe consumer contracts’ terms of use is 
novel in published literature, though I did hear Professor Pamela Samuelson use it in a 
conference I attended. 
 12 Apart from the no-review example I give in this Article, the widely mocked, and 
largely unsuccessful, attempt to use precatory terms of use as the basis for violation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213, codified at 18 USC § 1001 
et seq, provides both a cautionary tale and evidence of the point. As the leading commentator 
on the statute argued, the prosecution was problematic in part because “Internet users rou-
tinely click through such agreements on the assumption that they are legal mumbo jumbo 
that don’t impact what users are allowed to do.” Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 Minn L Rev 1561, 1582 (2010). 
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would permit it.13 Though controversial among academics, these 
clauses are rarely, if ever, enforced against consumers.14 
A different way to think about these clauses is behavioral: 
content providers hope to influence how their users interact with 
their intellectual property.15 Take a single example: HBO Go. For 
those who, for whatever reason, are not Game of Thrones fans and 
consequently don’t subscribe,16 HBO Go enables users to stream 
the channel’s programs to their screen, untethered to their cable 
connection. Obviously, HBO is concerned that users might ex-
pand the scope of the license in various ways. It expresses that 
concern in a contract term, buried in a 7,100-plus-word terms of 
use. The seventh section is titled “RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF 
MATERIALS.”17 To save space, I’ve cut out some words. Still, the 
mind reels: 
(a) You may not copy, reproduce, distribute, transfer, sell, li-
cense, publish, enter into a database, display, perform pub-
licly, modify, create derivative works, upload, edit, post, link 
to, frame, transmit, rent, lease, lend or sublicense or in any 
way exploit any part of the Services, or attempt to interfere 
with the operation of the Services in any way, except that you 
may access and display material and all other Content dis-
played on the Services for non-commercial, personal, enter-
tainment use for a limited time only as strictly authorized 
 
 13 See Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contract Conflict, 
103 Va L Rev 1141, 1198, 1203 (2017) (describing common “super-copyright” contractual 
provisions that preclude fair use of copyrighted material). 
 14 See id at 1197–1204 (analyzing 279 cases in which contract claims were asserted 
and finding no consumer defendants). For discussion of these controversial clauses, see 
Guy A. Rub, Contracting around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for Unbundling of Rights in 
Creative Works, 78 U Chi L Rev 257, 277 (2011) (discussing possible costs of fair use–
restricting contracts to “transformative users”); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn 
L Rev 459 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand L Rev 1799, 
1805 (2000) (describing a “growing body of copyright scholarship” advocating “the freedom 
to contract around copyright limitations such as . . . the fair use doctrine”); David Nimmer, 
Elliot Brown, and Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 Cal 
L Rev 17, 74 (1999) (arguing that license provisions that impermissibly restrict fair use 
rights should be invalid). 
 15 See Zev J. Eigen, An Experimental Test of the Effectiveness of Terms & Conditions 
*3 (Northwestern Law & Economics Research Paper No 13-32), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7D9Y-ZB7K. 
 16 This is a mistake, even if George R.R. Martin will never, ever finish writing the 
series. See Hoffman, 91 NYU L Rev at 1599 n 15 (cited in note 7) (explaining the problem 
of fantasy authors promising too much). 
 17 HBO Go Terms (HBO Go, Apr 3, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/NUR5 
-DCYX?type=image. 
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herein. You may not use any data mining, robots, or similar 
data gathering and extraction tools on the Services or on any 
portion of the Service, or frame any portion of the Service. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, you may not 
distribute any part of the Services over any network, includ-
ing a local area network, nor sell or offer it for sale. You may 
not assign, sublicense, pledge or transfer any of your rights 
or obligations under this Agreement to any person or entity 
without HBO’s prior written consent which may be withheld 
in HBO’s sole discretion (and any such purposed assignment, 
pledge or transfer without such prior written consent shall 
be void ab initio). In addition, these files may not be used to 
construct any kind of database. . . . Using any material on 
any other Service or networked computer environment is pro-
hibited. Also prohibited are: decompiling, reverse engineer-
ing, disassembling, or otherwise reducing the code used in 
any software or digital rights management feature on the 
Services into a readable form in order to examine the con-
struction of such software and/or to copy or create other prod-
ucts based (in whole or in part) on such software or any fea-
ture of the Services, or intercepting and/or recording network 
communications transmitted between the Services and 
HBO. . . . (c) HBO and its partners and affiliates may suspend 
or terminate your subscription and access to the Services im-
mediately if HBO reasonably determines that you are in vio-
lation of this Agreement or receives information that you no 
longer meet the Eligibility Criteria. In such event, you must 
cease all use of the Services. The suspension or termination 
of your subscription is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any 
rights and remedies available to HBO, its partners and affil-
iates under this Agreement or under applicable laws.18 
Let’s stipulate that the only nonlawyer in the history of the 
world who read that entire “paragraph” was the poor 2L student 
who checked it for accuracy.19 If you feel shamed by the last sen-
tence and resolve to go back and really read it this time, you 
would find that HBO’s customers promise to do all sorts of things 
they will not be sued for failing to do, including watching Cersei 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Sorry not sorry. 
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Lannister burn her enemies over a local area network.20 Yet it is 
impossible to imagine that any ordinary consumer would be 
tempted to read this exhortation or, having read it, change her 
behavior.21 And for a small yet significant class of consumers, 
these warnings may even encourage unlicensed activity.22 
What, then, is the point of precatory fine print? When 
pressed, some argue that it offers firms a sort of option value. It’s 
not as if firms hope to enforce terms either in or out of court. Ra-
ther, the terms provide rights to be exercised rarely—that is, 
when consumers act in highly disruptive ways.23 This opportunis-
tic account dominates discussions not just of exculpatory con-
sumer contract clauses but also of precatory ones. In effect, most 
scholars think of precatory clauses as little more than exculpatory 
clauses occasionally enforced through demand letters and algo-
rithmic moderators instead of motions to dismiss. Accordingly, 
precatory fine print is rarely the subject of distinct law review 
treatments.24 
 
 20 Admit it, you got bored and stopped reading. And I excised around 100 words from 
the middle just to make it easier for you. 
 21 See Jenna Wortham, The Unrepentant Bootlegger (NY Times Sept 27, 2014), online 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/technology/the-unrepentant-bootlegger.html (visited 
Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 22 See Eigen, An Experimental Test at *22–23 (cited in note 15) (finding that terms 
and conditions induced more cheating than other forms of behavioral modification). 
 23 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in 
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 Mich L Rev 827, 833–34 (2006) (describing how firms 
“dependably treat consumers much better than their contracts require them to do” in re-
sponse to consumer expectations). 
 24 The best paper in this field is an unpublished experimental piece by Zev Eigen. 
Eigen, An Experimental Test at *3–7 (cited in note 15) (arguing that firms wrongly use 
terms and conditions to attempt to reduce digital piracy). Other good related work includes 
Danielle Keats Citron, Online Engagement on Equal Terms, BU L Rev Online (Oct 19, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SVY6-HTFX (showing that Twitter, for instance, has 
increased the number of demands it makes on consumers over the years); M. Ryan Calo, 
Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 Notre Dame L Rev 1027, 1057–
58 (2012) (suggesting that the existence of a website privacy policy may influence con-
sumer behavior even if it is not read); Danielle Keats Citron and Helen Norton, 
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 
91 BU L Rev 1435, 1440, 1478–79 (2011) (suggesting that intermediaries can use terms of 
service to civilize internet behavior); Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 
Am U L Rev 1635, 1650–53 (2011) (arguing for a design-centered contract law that recog-
nizes that elements of a website’s design can constitute a promise); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, 
Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 McGill L J 427, 
435–38 (2008) (discussing the use of EULAs to govern virtual worlds); Lee Anne Fennell, 
Contracting Communities, 2004 U Ill L Rev 829, 884–90 (discussing residential commu-
nity contracts). There is also a literature on the relationship of criminal sanctions to con-
tract terms, which appears to take the standard line. For example, see Orin S. Kerr, 
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse 
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This option account proves too little. Descriptively, in many 
industries the value for the “option” would be vanishingly low, as 
the reputational costs for triggering it would be exceptionally 
high.25 Moreover, even if firms want to preserve their ex post op-
tions, why have they done so through a communicative medium 
that’s famously unread? Why haven’t they innovated to find ways 
to both corral their customers ex ante and also preserve their flex-
ibility ex post? 
Some have argued that the current look and feel of the fine 
print is evidence of a market failure resulting from a monopoly: 
the organized bar. As imperfect—and badly trained—agents, 
lawyers simply can’t solve clients’ consumer contracting problems 
and repeatedly turn to the tools closest at hand.26 In other words: 
the fine print looks the way it does because lawyers have failed to 
innovate even though innovation would be valuable for their 
clients. Thus, we will have communicative contracts only in a 
world in which the gates around the profession are breached, and 
lawyers can join hands with accountants and engineers to build 
better forms. 
This story is also incomplete. In this Article, I challenge the 
conventional wisdom by providing examples of mass-market 
terms that seem to really influence user behavior outside of court. 
I do so through a series of interview-generated case studies of the 
user agreements from prominent new-economy firms, including 
Etsy, Airbnb, Tumblr, and Kickstarter. This is good news: it may 
suggest a distinct way forward in our understanding of the future 
of contracting online. Firms can innovate in this space, if they 
want to, and lawyers can help them do so. 
 
Statutes, 78 NYU L Rev 1596, 1659 (2003) (criticizing regulation by contractual terms of 
use in part because they are widely known to be unread and unclear). 
 25 The Recording Industry Association of America, for example, abandoned its cam-
paign to sue users for downloading music after it became a “public-relations disaster.” 
Sarah McBride and Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits (Wall St J, Dec 
19, 2008), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122966038836021137 (visited Mar 31, 
2018) (Perma archive unavailable). Even threats to sue can be disastrous. The “Streisand 
Effect” was a term coined by Mike Masnick in 2005 to explain how attempts to remove 
information from the internet frequently cause that information to become even more sa-
lient. See Mike Masnick, For 10 Years Everyone’s Been Using “The Streisand Effect” with-
out Paying; Now I’m Going to Start Issuing Takedowns (TechDirt, Jan 8, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/4WMX-2VYT. 
 26 See Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World at 228–37 (cited in note 8) (blaming the bar 
monopoly for law schools’ and lawyers’ failure to innovate around terms); Eigen, An 
Experimental Test at *3–5 (cited in note 15) (noting lawyers’ risk aversion as a driver of 
the failure to innovate). 
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Close inspection of these innovative agreements suggests 
they might represent a new form of contracting, which I call “re-
lational contracts of adhesion.” Unlike firms deploying typical, 
adhesive, mass-consumer contracts, these new firms actively try 
to motivate readership. In so doing, they hope to govern ex ante 
behavior without recourse to court sanctions, do not inevitably 
seize every advantage, harmonize the look and feel of the terms 
with their larger brands as an aspect of trade dress, and have 
seemingly succeeded in creating mass-market forms that have 
some of the attributes of “real” contracts. They are thus relational. 
But unlike traditional relational contracts between firms, 
these contracts are not negotiated, the parties are at best loosely 
bound, and the users are both merchants and consumers at the 
same time. That is, successful precatory terms are neither fish 
nor fowl: they take on aspects of both the fabled past of individu-
alized contracting and the cynical present of exploitative stand-
ard terms. On the whole, my description of relational contracts of 
adhesion challenges the prevailing account of consumer contract-
ing in the sharing economy, which is typically focused on its dys-
topian and exploitative aspects.27 
This Article thus has several goals. First, I want to carve out 
precatory terms in adhesion contracts as the objects of study. 
Though consumer contracts have been discussed at length for dec-
ades, the degree to which they contain language that purports to 
persuade rather than compel has been largely ignored by contract 
theorists. Part I of this Article provides some examples of preca-
tory terms in their fine-print context, and Part II pieces together 
the standard account for their continued existence. But the stand-
ard account is unconvincing. Part III offers a series of case study 
examples, based on interviews with market players, of precatory 
terms that seem to be functional in motivating user behavior out-
side of court. Part IV offers a theory that knits together these case 
studies and suggests that they illustrate a distinct form of rela-
tional contracting. The conditions giving rise to these contracts 
may suggest the need for different forms of government interven-
tion in the sharing economy. 
 
 27 See, for example, Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1660–61 (cited in note 
8) (arguing that contracting is a way that firms like Uber exploit their drivers). 
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I.  PRECATORY TERMS BRIEFLY DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED 
To start, I confess to using the word precatory in an idiosyn-
cratic sense. Ordinarily, precatory legal language has no legal ef-
fect at all28—for example, a clause in a will expressing the testa-
tor’s desires about her pet’s care.29 But some of the fine print I 
describe is in theory enforceable in court. For the purposes of this 
Article, I define precatory fine print as language in a mass-
market contract that (1) is exceedingly unlikely to be enforced in 
court; (2) purports to govern the user’s conduct outside of the de-
cision to purchase; and (3) introduces terms that the firm would 
like, all else equal, to see performed. 
I have already mentioned that intellectual property contracts 
are paradigmatic examples of precatory terms. These are both 
omnipresent and never enforced against consumers.30 Perhaps be-
cause of that lack of enforcement, there is little evidence that any 
consumer has been motivated by the terms and conditions of li-
censed intellectual property to avoid copying.31 It’s a puzzle. Here 
is a field in which the firm-side demand to regulate consumers—
to have them behave differently—is high. However, though the 
underlying firms are innovative and dynamic players in a rapidly 
changing market, they have settled on a particularly inane strat-
egy. Each imposes boilerplate prohibitions that are as hard to un-
derstand as they are to read from beginning to end. 
Other precatory terms purport to control consumer speech, 
creating a “sort of jurisprudence” for all speech acts on a particu-
lar platform.32 Indeed, as Professor Jeffrey Rosen has observed, 
consumer contracts seem to give the employees of digital compa-
nies “more power over who gets heard around the globe than any 
 
 28 Black’s Law Dictionary 1366 (10th ed 2014) (defining “precatory word[s]” as “expres-
sions of requests, desires, or recommendations, as distinguished from commands” and noting 
that “[g]enerally, precatory words are not recognized as legally enforceable instructions”). 
 29 See Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the Law of 
Precatory Words in Wills, 22 Wis Women’s L J 1, 16 (2007) (describing precatory language 
in wills concerning pets). 
 30 Rub, 103 Va L Rev at 1184–91 (cited in note 13) (discussing the set of doctrinal 
and practical hurdles to using contracts to enforce anticopying rules). 
 31 See id at 1198. 
 32 Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of 
Google and Twitter, 127 Harv L Rev 2259, 2273 (2014), quoting Somini Sengupta, Twitter 
Yields to Pressure in Hate Case in France (NY Times, July 12, 2013), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/technology/twitter-yields-to-pressure-in-hate-case-in 
-france.html (visited Apr 11, 2018) (Perma link unavailable). 
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politician or bureaucrat—more power, in fact, than any president 
or judge.”33 
The easiest example to parse is a digital media site that pro-
hibits, using a contract, certain kinds of comments on news sto-
ries. Breitbart News, a site that we might not ordinarily associate 
with civility, enjoins its users with a long list of ways that they 
may not interact with the webpage, all in boilerplate form. For 
example, users agree not to: 
use the Services in any way that abuses, defames, stalks, an-
noys, threatens, harasses or violates the rights of privacy, 
publicity, intellectual property or other legal rights of a per-
son or entity (now or hereafter recognized) or which encour-
ages conduct which would violate any law or give rise to civil 
or criminal liability or post, publish, transmit, distribute, dis-
seminate or upload any inappropriate, infringing, defama-
tory, profane, indecent, obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, ex-
cessively violent or illegal/unlawful material or matters, 
including, without limitation, information, topics, names or 
other material; 
 
. . . 
 
[provide user content that] degrades others on the basis of 
gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex-
ual preference, orientation or identity, disability, or other 
classification.34 
A related attempt to control user behavior occurs when firms 
that sell goods to the public attempt to control their “commu-
nity’s” behavior on the firm’s own site. That behavior’s locus is 
typically user reviews. Firms actively monitor and moderate re-
views ex post, but they also attempt to shape them ex ante 
 
 33 Jeffrey Rosen, This Hate Has Been Removed by the Administrator, New Republic 
22 (May 13, 2013). See also Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled 
Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 Notre Dame L Rev 1035, 1038 (2018) (describing 
transnational problems of private speech in TOS enforcement). See also generally Kate 
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 
131 Harv L Rev 1598 (2018) (describing content moderation). 
 34 Terms of Use (Breitbart, June 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5CLE-TY27. 
As some have pointed out, universities also try to control speech using contract. See Robert 
H. Jerry II and Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.1: Public Higher Education Institutions 
and Social Media, 14 Fla Coastal L Rev 55, 80–88 (2012) (discussing various universities’ 
use of customized social media terms and conditions to attempt to set discursive norms). 
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through the terms of use. For example, Lululemon’s website’s 
8,816-word terms of use include the user’s agreement to avoid 
comments that “defame, abuse, harass, stalk, threaten, or other-
wise violate the legal rights (such as rights of privacy and 
publicity) of others”; the use of “racially, ethnically, or otherwise 
offensive language”; or posting anything “that depicts cruelty to 
animals.”35 Birchbox, which provides beauty products on a sub-
scription basis, prohibits (in the tenth section of its website’s 
svelte 5,172-word terms and conditions) “unduly critical or spite-
ful comments of other content posted on the page or its authors.”36 
A different problem is posed when parties aggrieved by a 
firm’s services comment on third-party sites. A single negative re-
view may have disproportionately large effects on goodwill.37 
Here, obviously, the firm can’t easily resort to self-help by simply 
removing the offending comment. In response, starting in the 
mid-2000s, businesses turned to the fine print: clauses in con-
sumer contracts telling users not to negatively review their prod-
ucts, sometimes enforced through penalty damages.38 Such 
clauses (which often backfired against their drafters) are now un-
enforceable, following the passage of the Consumer Review 
Fairness Act39 making all anti-review contract clauses void.40 That 
federal law was passed after the election of President Donald 
Trump and signed by President Barack Obama in his waning 
days in office. The Act, enacted at a moment when political ten-
sions were at a historical apogee, evidences our nearly universal 
disdain for the fine print.41 
A final set of examples comes from the platform economy. 
Many platform firms attempt to control users’ ability to share a 
 
 35 Terms of Use (Lululemon, Sept 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8LBL-KRGR. 
 36 Terms and Conditions (Birchbox, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BGN5-NY2Y. 
 37 Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System? Consumer “Gag” 
Contracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7 Wm & Mary Bus L Rev 59, 
92 (2016) (“[T]he posting of a single negative review online could cause business revenues 
to plummet about 25 percent or more.”). 
 38 See Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24 
Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev 1, 2–4 (2017) (describing the history of antireview clauses and 
explaining that some firms use these clauses to impose monetary fines on consumers). 
 39 Pub L No 114-258, 130 Stat 1355 (2016), codified at 15 USC § 45b. 
 40 15 USC § 45b. 
 41 Professor Danielle Citron prompts me to wonder whether the rejection of review 
clauses is instead an illustration of our free speech tradition. See Danielle Keats Citron, 
Hate Crimes in Cyberspace 199–218 (Harvard 2016) (discussing various forms of cyber 
harassment in the context of the First Amendment). Yet the absence of a similar public 
outcry against common confidentiality clauses, which are more seriously negotiated but 
which cause similar deprivation of market-relevant information, seems telling. 
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single user account with multiple individuals. LinkedIn’s User 
Agreement, for instance, requires that adherents: “(1) try to 
choose a strong and secure password; (2) keep your password se-
cure and confidential; (3) not transfer any part of your account 
(e.g., connections) and (4) follow the law and our list of Dos and 
Don’ts.”42 Those Dos and Don’ts include an injunction whereby us-
ers promise to “[p]rovide accurate information to us and keep it 
updated.”43 
A different kind of term appears to try to control offline cus-
tomer behavior. Zipcar, for instance, permits its users (who, es-
sentially, rent cars) to drive for services like Lyft and Uber. But, 
bizarrely, it attempts to use contract to control whom users 
transport. As its Membership Contract states, “It is prohibited to 
use a Zipcar vehicle for the transportation of third party goods for 
payment such as, but not limited to, providing courier or delivery 
services. In addition, it is prohibited to transport professional 
sports persons or professional entertainers in a Zipcar vehicle.”44 
The backstory of that provision would be interesting to 
learn.45 However, it’s not unique: firms routinely enlist contract 
to try to control user behavior in ways that might mitigate their 
business risk but provide few additional legal protections. 
Feastly, a site that matches meal preparers with those who want 
to eat, makes the chefs promise not to “violate any local, state, 
provincial, national, or other law or regulation, or any order of a 
court, including, without limitation, zoning restrictions.”46 
TaskRabbit, which matches the handy with the not, prohibits 
posting tasks that require users to cross state lines.47 Instacart, 
which fills your fridge, makes customers promise that they will 
 
 42 User Agreement (LinkedIn, June 7, 2017), online at http://www.linkedin.com/ 
legal/user-agreement (visited Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Zipcar Membership Contract—Floating Model (Zipcar Belgium, Aug 19, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/BZL3-WKAH. 
 45 Avis, which owns Zipcar, has a different structure to its terms and conditions. 
First, it conditions assent to its use clause on an exclusion from Avis’s insurance and an 
immediate termination of the rental. Rental Terms and Conditions: United States and 
Canada *4 (Avis, Apr 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5NCC-FGXR. Second, the use 
clause prohibits using the car to “carry passengers . . . for hire,” a use permitted by Zipcar. 
Id at *5. That is, if I were to drive Beyoncé to a concert for free, I’d violate Zipcar’s terms 
of use, but not Avis’s. If I charged her, I’d violate both provisions. If I ferried one of 
Beyoncé’s fans home at a price, I’d violate Avis’s but not Zipcar’s terms. The likelihood 
that this parsing is apparent to anyone in the world ex ante is vanishingly low. 
 46 Terms and Conditions (Feastly, Oct 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/289E-6TZ9. 
 47 TaskRabbit Terms of Service (TaskRabbit, Mar 1, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5CW4-94A8. 
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not be intoxicated when they receive alcohol from the site.48 Box, 
which provides file storage, requires users to avoid “use in con-
nection with any purposes or intended application which involves 
risks or dangers that could lead to death, serious bodily injury, 
severe physical or property damage, or . . . in connection with op-
eration of . . . nuclear facilities.”49 
In considering each of these examples, we should ask: If firms 
really want consumers to do the things they are asking them to 
do, why would they use mass-market fine print to communicate 
their goals? And if they actually don’t care if consumers listen, 
why bother writing such terms at all? 
II.  STANDARD ACCOUNTS FOR THE PERSISTENCE OF PRECATORY 
FINE PRINT 
This Part considers the standard explanations for precatory 
fine print in the modern economy and finds them, in the end, in-
complete. I start with some hopefully uncontroversial proposi-
tions about the relationship between terms and behavior. 
A. Commercial Terms and Contract Behavior 
In some contexts, it is axiomatic that terms govern perfor-
mance.50 Why else would they exist?51 The normal science of the 
economic analysis of contract focuses on the effect of different 
terms on different levels of effort: parties take greater precautions 
against breach when damages are higher; they are more likely to 
 
 48 Terms and Conditions (Instacart, Aug 2, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6EBV 
-LHAF. 
 49 Box Terms of Service (Box, Aug 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/UX42-NZQ9. No-
tably, another product with the similar name of DropBox Inc does offer services directly to 
nuclear facilities, by way of a large, metal toilet. DropBox Inc. and the Sanitation Station. 
Portable Restroom Trailers (Sept 28, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/6KCR-QYBQ. 
 50 For an illustrative paper, see generally Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, 
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L J 541 (2003). Schwartz and 
Scott discuss an efficiency theory of firm-firm contracting, pointing out that court involve-
ment would be limited as most contracts would be self-enforcing. Id at 556–59. It’s just as 
axiomatic that marking the parties’ obligations isn’t the only thing that “contract” does. 
See Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 L & Society Rev 91, 91 (2003) 
(“Contracts are many things to many people.”). 
 51 See Suchman, 37 L & Society Rev at 112 (cited in note 50) (providing an account 
of contract as a “significant gesture” that “allow[s] transacting parties to communicate 
messages to one another or to third-party observers”). 
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perform when terms are clearly expressed; etc.52 Between firms, 
terms matter.53 
In the consumer sphere, by contrast, most (if not all) of the 
extant theoretical work on the behavioral effect of terms is explic-
itly posed as hypothetical at best.54 True, data from lab experi-
ments do suggest that terms—when read—can influence behav-
ior.55 But, excepting warranties,56 terms are almost never 
 
 52 For examples and lucid analysis, see Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The 
Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 Va L Rev 1523, 1577–85 (2016). 
 53 This is not to say that each term is perfectly performed or that legal sanctions are 
necessary, as reputational concerns play important roles. For example, see Lisa Bernstein, 
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, 
Norms and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724, 1767 (2001) (describing the role of trade 
associations in creating effective reputational constraints); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am Sociological Rev 55, 63–
65 (1963) (discussing reputation-based “non-legal sanctions” that often take the place of 
formal contract terms). 
 54 See, for example, Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: 
New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 Va L Rev 1939, 1954–55 n 32 (2011) (arguing 
that firms are more likely to maximize monetary returns in contracts than individuals); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J Inst & 
Theoretical Econ 142, 145 (2004) (imagining a world of “efficacious” consumer contracts). 
 55 See Stanislav Mamonov and Raquel Benbunan-Fich, An Empirical Investigation 
of Privacy Breach Perceptions among Smartphone Application Users, 49 Computers Hum 
Behav 427, 432–33 (2015) (finding that the presence of legal permissions in TOS reduced 
smartphone users’ perceptions of privacy breach but finding no significant age effects in 
sample of approximately 200 Amazon Mechanical Turk subjects); David A. Hoffman and 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U Chi L Rev 395, 418–
19 (2013) (finding, based on survey results, that people are more likely to protect their 
interests against a prospective contractual counterparty than an actual contractual coun-
terparty and proposing psychological explanations); Eigen, 168 J Inst & Theoretical Econ 
at 135–36 (cited in note 7); Yuval Feldman and Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual 
Obligations Created Equal?, 100 Georgetown L J 5, 31 (2011) (“The content of contracts, 
notwithstanding the legal price of breach, induces compliance.”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do 
Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 Mich L Rev 633, 
665 (2010) (concluding that “the presence of a liquidated-damages clause in a contract 
reduces [moral] qualms and, in turn, encourages breach”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and 
Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J 
Empirical Legal Stud 405, 420–21 (2009) (finding that subjects exhibited greater moral 
disapproval and awarded greater damages for efficient breaches as compared with 
breaches to avoid a loss). But see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz and Matthew B. Kugler, Is 
Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J Legal Stud S69, S76–77 (2016) 
(reporting survey findings that users do not consider differences in privacy policy language 
relevant to whether they have authorized websites to collect personal information). 
 56 In many market segments, warranties are subject to strong market forces. See 
Yair Listokin, The Meaning of Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment, 2 J Legal Analysis 
397, 406–10 (2010) (reporting findings that consumers correctly priced variations in 
warranty language); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 
Yale L J 1297, 1347 (1981) (“[T]he allocation of responsibilities . . . by standardized war-
ranties is responsive to consumer preferences, and establishes coherent economic 
incentives for manufacturer and consumer investments.”). The two leading Federal Trade 
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read.57 Thus, although contracting terms are in theory part of the 
consumer products that they regulate,58 studies have shown that 
they are not typically amenable to competitive pressures.59 
Perhaps, some argue, precatory terms influence behavior 
through a more indirect route. There is evidence that individuals 
experience contracting as a ritual with some latent power, which 
tends to legitimate terms even when they are not read. As 
Professor Tess Wilkinson-Ryan puts it, “[A] policy’s inclusion in 
a form contract may reduce the likelihood that consumers will 
challenge a practice using market power, informal dispute mech-
anisms, the court system, or the political process.”60 The very act 
of consent “may remind the poster of the legally binding nature 
 
Commission studies on warranty readership (though dated) find that, generally, between 
20 and 30 percent of consumers read warranties before they purchased a good, and be-
tween 50 and 80 percent read after purchase. Arthur Young & Co, Warranties Rules 
Consumer Baseline Study: Final Report 58 (Federal Trade Commission 1979) (28.4 percent 
of all survey respondents read warranty prepurchase). These numbers provide evidence of 
readership rates, at least in the paper warranty context, orders of magnitudes higher than 
ordinary consumer contract fine print. Another datum comes from Robert A. Hillman, 
Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal 
Implications, in Jane K. Winn, ed, Consumer Protection in the Age of the “Information 
Economy” 283, 290–92 (Ashgate 2006) (reporting survey findings that of the minority of 
law student respondents who responded that they might read terms beyond price and de-
scription, nearly all did so to look at warranty descriptions). Generally speaking, consum-
ers are more likely to read warranties ex post than ex ante. See Shmuel I. Becher and Tal 
Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User 
Participation, 14 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev 303, 316 (2008) (arguing that scholars 
should more readily distinguish ex post and ex ante readership). 
 57 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen, 43 J Legal Stud at 19–22 (cited in note 
2); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the 
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts”, 78 U Chi L 
Rev 165, 179–81 (2011). 
 58 See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am U L Rev 131, 146–47 (1970) (char-
acterizing adhesion contracts as just one part of “a unitary, purchased bundle”). 
 59 See, for example, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of 
Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J Empirical Legal 
Stud 447, 451 (2008) (concluding that “there is no evidence” that “greater market power is 
associated with more pro-seller standard terms”). Field experiment data is generally in ac-
cord. See, for example, Enrique Seira, Alan Elizondo, and Eduardo Laguna-Müggenburg, Are 
Information Disclosures Effective? Evidence from the Credit Card Market, 9 Am Econ J: Econ 
Pol 277, 291–98 (2017) (finding very small or negative effects of personalized disclosures on 
credit card account holders’ behavior in a large randomized control trial); Bruno Ferman, 
Reading the Fine Print: Information Disclosure in the Brazilian Credit Card Market, 62 Man-
agement Science 3534, 3545 (2016) (reporting that, in a randomized field experiment, more 
salient disclosure of credit card interest rates did not affect consumer behavior except in 
high-risk clients); Sumit Agarwal, et al, Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence 
from Credit Cards, 130 Q J Econ 111, 147–52 (2015) (finding that the effect of a “months-to-
payoff” disclosure could not be precisely estimated). 
 60 Wilkinson-Ryan, 103 Cornell L Rev at 165 (cited in note 7). 
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of agreement.”61 Once reminded, users may “reconsider their 
communications.”62 
That is, we all know that some terms apply, and we may be 
behaviorally influenced by what we each imagine to be the rules 
of the road.63 To be concrete, when we agree to a user agreement 
before commenting online, perhaps we correctly intuit that the 
agreement tells us not to be a jerk and behave better as a result. 
However, even the most cutting-edge research has only begun to 
ask about individuals’ naïve views of consumer contract terms.64 
It seems unlikely that firms know more. 
 
 61 Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 Utah L Rev 
993, 1015. 
 62 Id. But see David A. Hoffman and Zev J. Eigen, Contract Consideration and 
Behavior, 85 Geo Wash L Rev 351, 385–88 (2017) (noting the lack of evidence of changed 
user behavior resulting from user consent to ostensibly legally binding agreements and 
arguing for new forms of formation formality); Monika Leszczyńska, Think Twice before 
You Sign! An Experiment on a Cautionary Function of Contract Formalities *12 (un-
published manuscript, Sept 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8CBF-MD94 (reporting 
survey findings that individuals acted more impulsively when clicking a box than when 
signing their name during interactions with websites’ forms). 
 63 Wilkinson-Ryan provides some evidence in support of this hypothesis. Wilkinson-
Ryan, 103 Cornell L Rev at 164–65 (cited in note 7). See also Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L 
Rev at 600–01 (cited in note 1) (discussing divergent consumer views as to what privacy 
policies say); Eigen, 168 J Inst & Theoretical Econ at 135–37 (cited in note 7) (showing that, 
as individuals spent more time reading the contract ex ante, they were more likely to perform 
in accordance with its terms ex post). This sort of intuition gives rise to the famously unsuc-
cessful Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211, otherwise known as the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine. As the Restatement puts it, “Although customers typically adhere to stand-
ardized agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard 
terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reason-
able expectation.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 211(f) (1979). 
 64 There are a number of papers that discuss the terms that consumers expect, but 
which do not focus on performance obligations. For example, consumers do not seem to 
accurately recall the presence of certain clauses in some consumer contracts. See, for ex-
ample, Jeff Sovern, et al, “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An 
Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 Md L Rev 
1, 41 (2015) (reporting survey results in which few consumers recalled seeing an arbitra-
tion agreement in a contract that contained one); Debra Pogrund Stark, Jessica M. 
Choplin, and Eileen Linnabery, Dysfunctional Contracts and the Laws and Practices That 
Enable Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 Ind L Rev 797, 813–20 (2013) (reporting survey 
findings showing that real estate consumers exhibited a poor understanding of waivers of 
remedies); Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship among Citizenship, 
Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 Conn L Rev 381, 414–16 (2008) (reporting 
survey results in which only 17 percent of an employee sample recalled that an employ-
ment agreement they signed contained an arbitration clause). There is a more robust lit-
erature about naïve views of legal rules outside of contract. For example, see Gregory N. 
Mandel, Anne A. Fast, and Kristina R. Olson, Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism 
Fallacy, 2015 BYU L Rev 915, 946–47 (reporting experimental results on individuals’ in-
correct views about the content of intellectual property law). 
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In fact, if consumer contracts are really just adding an extra 
feeling of heft behind implicit performance terms, why should 
firms insert any explicit behavioral terms at all, especially be-
cause term drafting is costly and may result in blowback?65 Some 
might respond that firms hope to influence the collective under-
standing of what terms are normal by pushing out particular lan-
guage—that is, to create collective reasonable expectations one 
term at a time.66 The idea isn’t actually so outlandish over a long 
enough time.67 But it is hard to imagine that any firms follow this 
kind of generational strategy.68 
Thus, the best extant empirical evidence about how ordinary 
precatory fine print functions concludes that it doesn’t, at least 
with respect to ex ante behavioral regulation and deterrence. 
B. The Standard Account: The Option Value of Fine Print 
Given that terms are unread, why do firms waste the time 
drafting them? Most argue, in one form or another, that even if 
terms don’t affect behavior ex ante, they certainly can ex post. 
That claim is common with respect to terms that limit consumer 
rights: explicit terms make legal defenses stronger.69 However, 
the defense doesn’t require all terms to be litigated, and it 
 
 65 For general discussion of a type of blowback, see Ethan J. Leib and Zev J. Eigen, 
Consumer Form Contracting in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: The Unread and the 
Undead, 2017 U Ill L Rev 65, 101–02. 
 66 See id at 79 (“The more we fail to resist zombie [boilerplate] contracts, the easier 
it is for drafting entities to assert that they hold a reasonable belief that individuals man-
ifesting assent to terms would still do so, even in the face of more and more rights-
encroaching terms.”). 
 67 It is hard to find data that supports or refutes the idea that individuals’ subjective 
expectations of contract terms have changed. And yet, in the 1980s, for example, forum 
selection clauses were seen as controversial and seemingly limited to negotiated deals. 
However, over time (helped by the Supreme Court) they have become anodyne. See 
Carnival Cruise Lines v Shute, 499 US 585, 593–94 (1991) (broadening the enforceability 
of standardized forum selection clauses in large part because they save litigation costs). 
 68 For one, it might not work! There is evidence from the privacy context that subjec-
tive views about Fourth Amendment privacy may be relatively fixed. See Matthew B. 
Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U Chi 
L Rev 1747, 1794–95 (2017) (finding that, while Supreme Court decisions had short-term 
effects on the public’s views on lawful surveillance, these effects disappeared over time). 
After reading a copy of this Article, Professor Danielle Citron, however, suggested to me 
that Facebook’s real name policy might be an example of a firm with just such a long-term 
commitment in mind, based on Mark Zuckerberg’s personal commitments. 
 69 Eigen, An Experimental Test at *5 (cited in note 15) (describing the common notion 
that, without media use contracts, “companies would be left with greater costs of policing 
implied contractual rights in court, instead of being able to rely on the explicit wording of 
the ‘fine print’”). 
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acknowledges that in fact firms rarely insist on the actual lan-
guage in their consumer contracts. Rather, the terms are used op-
portunistically, policing consumers on the margin.70 The fine print 
functions as an option. 
This view is most closely associated with a short essay by 
Professor Lucian Bebchuk and former Judge Richard Posner.71 
Bebchuk and Posner claim that aversive terms in consumer con-
tracts are intended to give firms the flexibility to police “egre-
gious” conduct that is not easily reducible to semantic contract 
terms.72 By giving firms “discretion” in dealing with consumers, 
terms that look one-sided turn out in practice to harm few con-
sumers.73 The firm can choose to exercise its rights when it is in 
its interest to do so. These options—even if implicit—have value 
for their holders.74 
This option-centered account sheds light on some puzzling 
features of current practice outside of the conventional context of 
defenses to obligation. Precatory terms are sometimes “exer-
cised,” though not in court.75 Reference to them makes it easier 
for sites to ban abusive commentators without recourse to legal 
process, and they serve as a defense in actions by commentators 
and the third parties they might have harmed.76 Generally, firms 
 
 70 Bebchuk and Posner, 104 Mich L Rev at 833–34 (cited in note 23) (describing how 
firms use their contractual terms to enforce policies against consumers who do not act in 
good faith). See also Johnston, 104 Mich L Rev at 877 (cited in note 5) (“The strategy of 
allowing employees the discretion to grant case-specific benefits beyond those that are 
required by the standard-form contract can be seen to be a sophisticated way for the firm 
to grow its revenues.”). 
 71 See generally Bebchuk and Posner, 104 Mich L Rev 827 (cited in note 23). 
 72 Id at 831. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See, for example, George S. Geis, Book Review, Economics as Context for Contract 
Law, 75 U Chi L Rev 569, 585–86 (2008) (explaining the importance of option theory to 
contract law); Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case 
against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 Colum L Rev 1428, 1460 (2004) (describing 
the option to behave opportunistically as a valuable part of contracting). 
 75 See Ammori, 127 Harv L Rev at 2274–78 (cited in note 32) (describing the imple-
mentation of speech codes contained in TOS at various digital companies through “private 
jurisprudence”). 
 76 But see Kim, 2009 Utah L Rev at 1028–29 n 144 (cited in note 61) (noting that a 
firm was investigated for consumer fraud for failing to enforce its own terms and condi-
tions against abuse and subsequently changed its terms). The fact that most actions 
against firms that ban content that is barred by their TOS fail on § 230 grounds makes 
the marginal legal utility of TOS particularly puzzling. See 47 USC § 230(c)(2)(A) (“No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any 
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that 
the provider or user considers to be . . . objectionable.”). 
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will prefer to point out explicit reasons for self-help to consumers 
so as to avoid reputational blowback.77 This works because con-
sumers generally think contracts are legitimate—even adhesive 
contracts on the web.78 Thus, precatory consumer contract terms 
permit firms to cheaply weed out particular bad consumers from 
communities that would otherwise be contaminated by their 
presence.79 
Options can also be exercised to police competitors. ProCD v 
Zeidenberg,80 an early internet law case, fits that fact pattern. In 
ProCD, the court enforced a noncommercial use limitation on use 
of a database (which was otherwise not subject to copyright). 
Judge Frank Easterbrook explicitly framed the problem as one of 
permitting price discrimination by preserving the firm’s option to 
police competitors who came dressed as consumers, writing that 
“Zeidenberg wants to use the data without paying the seller’s 
price.”81 Or contracts might be used as evidence in suits that firms 
tried (but failed) to prevent bad conduct, like harassing speech or 
copyright infringement.82 The terms, in short, are a defensive 
shield behind which the firm has room to maneuver.83 
 
 77 See Ponte, 7 Wm & Mary Bus L Rev at 78–79 (cited in note 37) (“Often, nondis-
paragement provisions are framed in a manner that keeps the primary focus on the busi-
ness investment in the brand’s development and establishment of its goodwill in the mar-
ketplace, while obscuring the effort to limit consumer speech.”). See also Becher and 
Zarsky, 14 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev at 322–28 (cited in note 56) (discussing ways that 
consumers learn of terms ex post). 
 78 See Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: 
Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J Legal Analysis 1, 41–42 (2017) (noting that, 
when contracts include “unenforceable and misleading terms,” consumers who are unfamil-
iar with the law may rationally believe that terms are enforceable and binding when they 
are not); Wilkinson-Ryan, 103 Cornell L Rev at 121 (cited in note 7) (arguing that firms use 
boilerplate because it may chill complaints); Dennis P. Stolle and Andrew J. Slain, Standard 
Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of 
Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 Behav Sci & L 83, 91–92 (1997) 
(reporting survey findings that “the presence of [boilerplate] exculpatory language did have 
a deterrent effect on participants’ propensity to seek compensation”). 
 79 See, for example, Citron and Norton, 91 BU L Rev at 1468–69 (cited in note 24) 
(describing how online platforms use their terms of use to justify removing hate speech). 
 80 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996). 
 81 Id at 1454. 
 82 See Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace at 169–72 (cited in note 41). 
 83 As Ed Ferguson, Vice President and Associate General Counsel at IAC, and 
Michael Cheah, General Counsel at Vimeo, explained to me, the TOS provide protection 
for the firm—the freedom of action to exclude users or manage disputes. Telephone 
Interview with Ed Ferguson and Michael Cheah (Apr 28, 2017) (“Interview with Ed 
Ferguson and Michael Cheah”) (on file with author). 
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Although it has significant explanatory force, the option 
theory doesn’t explain some puzzling aspects of the consumer con-
tracting universe.84 For one, enforcing buried terms may result in 
perverse effects. I have already mentioned reputational harms, 
but consider also the possibility that an entire industry may be-
come tainted by using contracts in opportunistic ways. Consum-
ers will then actively work to either avoid dealing with firms or 
behave unscrupulously in turn. This description marks the cur-
rent state of both the cable TV and the cellphone sectors.85 
Even if firms can avoid reputational sanctions, the option ex-
planation simply ignores the possibility that firms might really 
 
 84 See Feldman & Teichman, 100 Georgetown L J at 31, 49 (cited in note 55) (dis-
counting the option explanation after experimental study about individual motivations). 
Professor Guy Rub, in a survey of 279 reported decisions analyzing the copyright/contract 
nexus, found no examples of a consumer sued for breach of an intellectual property stand-
ard form contract. Rub, 103 Va L Rev at 1198 (cited in note 13). 
 85 For example, consumers often try to switch cellphone carriers notwithstanding 
cancellation fees. The result is large consumer debts. See In re Cellphone Termination Fee 
Cases, 193 Cal App 4th 298, 306 (2011) (explaining that Sprint assessed $299,473,408 in 
early termination fees during the class period, but only $73,775,975 was paid by consum-
ers). See also Consumer Credit Reports: A Study of Medical and Non-Medical Collections 
*19 (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Dec 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/U4FT 
-K2EQ (showing that telecom debts, at 8.7 percent, represent the second largest form of 
debt referred to collection agencies that shows up on consumer credit reports, after medi-
cal care). But firms rarely are made whole through debt collection, and typically they are 
thus left without real recourse for breach. See id at *34 (presenting data indicating that 
the average payment rate for debts referred to collection across six industries is only 6.7 
percent). The move to “no-contract clauses” is in this sense possibly a reaction to the failure 
of termination clauses in fixed-duration agreements. There is an interesting dynamic here, 
whereby no-contract clauses may be in part an attempt by the firm to make salient the 
alternative (termination fees) and thus affect the behavior of the small percentage of con-
sumers who stick with a contract deal. That is, by advertising “no contract,” the firm 
makes the remaining part of its consumer base realize that they are buying shackles and 
become constrained accordingly. Evidence for this proposition is suggestive: the churn rate 
during the period from 2013—the year when T-Mobile was the first major carrier to intro-
duce a no-contract plan—to 2017 shows a significant drop, from 3.3 percent to 2.29 per-
cent. Average Monthly Churn Rate for Wireless Carriers in the United States from 1st 
Quarter 2013 to 4th Quarter 2017 (Statista, 2018), online at http://www.statista.com/ 
statistics/283511/average-monthly-churn-rate-top-wireless-carriers-us/ (visited Mar 31, 
2018) (Perma archive unavailable). Additionally, as no-contract plans became more com-
mon, the media was particularly quick to argue that two-year agreements were akin to 
being in jail. See, for example, Alison Griswold, So Long, Cellphone Contracts. You Won’t 
Be Missed. (Slate, Aug 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/DFJ5-7UXE (arguing that, 
while most consumers will be happy to see the end of two-year contracts, some who do not 
mind the commitment and do not worry about having the newest phones will be better off 
staying on two-year plans); Joanna Stern, Kill the Wireless Contract! Buy Your Own Phone 
(Wall St J, Feb 25, 2015), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/kill-the-wireless-contract 
-buy-your-own-phone-1424807865 (visited Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(“Without much thought, I did what most Americans do every two years: I agreed to be 
locked in by a multibillion-dollar wireless company.”). 
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want to govern ex ante consumer behavior—that is, to use con-
tract to shape consumers’ activity in the absence of injury. One 
can’t really blame theorists for their lack of curiosity: they are 
observing a world of buried and hidden terms. But why has the 
market produced that outcome when firms appear to have signif-
icant incentives and capabilities to maximize the readership of at 
least some of their contracts?86 
Perhaps we can attribute the lack of innovation in consumer 
contracts to a market failure created by a particular, villainous 
guild. 
C. Legal Market Failure 
Whether because of social pressures that reward conform-
ity,87 the bar’s monopoly,88 a desire to please the client,89 the fear 
of legal liability, or network effects,90 lawyers generally are cast 
as reluctant contract innovators. Terms and conditions, as “con-
venient and known instruments” in the legal toolset, come easily 
to hand for lawyers who are tasked by their clients with solving 
 
 86 See, for example, Hoffman, 91 NYU L Rev at 1639 n 189 (cited in note 7) (discuss-
ing firm innovation around dynamic webpages that utilize data about prospective custom-
ers with the goal of encouraging them to shop); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious 
about User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for Software, 12 Geo Mason L Rev 687, 695–
96 (2004) (describing the benefits to firms of creating contracts that consumers can under-
stand ex ante, which include building goodwill and ensuring that consumers do not exceed 
the scope of their rights). 
 87 See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Contract, 58 Emory L J 1401, 1409 (2009) (noting that lawyers reuse language to “save 
themselves drafting costs, economize on learning costs, reuse ‘safe’ language that has been 
vetted by courts, and signal to prospective counterparties that the contract drafter does 
not seek an unfair advantage”). 
 88 See Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World at 228–37 (cited in note 8) (“[A] system based 
on this level of uniformity in thinking is an almost impossible environment for transform-
ative change.”). 
 89 See Eric A. Zacks, Contract Review: Cognitive Bias, Moral Hazard, and 
Situational Pressure, 9 Ohio St Entrepreneurial Bus L J 379, 417 (2015) (explaining that 
the desire to please the client induces an attorney “to revise the contract in a manner that 
minimizes the possibility of the revisions disrupting the transaction”). 
 90 See Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va L Rev 713, 725–27 (1997) 
(describing “network benefits” as a “set of advantages . . . available to a firm that adopts 
a contract term that is or will become contemporaneously used by many firms for a signif-
icant period of time”). 
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consumers’ behavioral problems.91 More exotic forms of regula-
tion, like visceral notice,92 are both unproven and could poten-
tially backfire.93 The result is an allegedly inefficient equilibrium.  
Zev Eigen makes this argument most bluntly: 
Lawyers at a firm do not like to be sued for malpractice any 
less than in-house counsel enjoy being fired. So generally 
speaking, it is a wise and rational self-preserving strategy to 
avoid reinventing the wheel or doing something differently 
from every other lawyer working for other similarly situated 
companies or firms. If every lawyer before you relied on terms 
and conditions to solve a problem, you should too. How could 
a client fault you for using the same tactics as every other 
lawyer?94 
Eigen is far from the only commentator to suggest that law-
yers have failed to offer creative and value-maximizing solutions 
to clients in the new economy.95 As Professor Gillian Hadfield has 
recently argued, many entrepreneurial businesses have come to 
conclude that large law firms cannot solve their business prob-
lems “at any price.”96 She points to the complaints of the general 
counsel of CBS, who finds that lawyers create terms and condi-
tions that either “lock [content] down” or entirely give it away.97 
CBS—and other companies navigating today’s economy—sought 
 
 91 Eigen, An Experimental Test at *4 (cited in note 15). 
 92 See Calo, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1030 (cited in note 24) (“Visceral notice . . . does 
not necessarily rely on describing practices in language or symbols. Rather, it leverages a 
consumer’s very experience of a product or service to warn or inform.”). 
 93 Though lawyers are traditionally seen as risk averse with respect to new technol-
ogies, they are often also criticized for taking risks by drafting to the edge of what’s en-
forceable. Sometimes, we can’t win. See Study of Uniform Commercial Code Memoranda 
Presented to the Commission and Stenographic Report of Public Hearing on Article 2 of the 
Code, NY State Law Revision Commission, Legislative Doc No 65 at 177 (1954) (statement 
of Professor Karl Llewellyn) (“Any engineer makes his construction within a margin of 
safety, and a wide margin of safety, so that he knows for sure that he is getting what he 
is gunning for. The practice of business lawyers has been, however . . . to draft . . . to the 
edge of the possible.”). 
 94 Eigen, An Experimental Test at *4 (cited in note 15). 
 95 See, for example, Royce de R. Barondes, The Business Lawyer as Terrorist 
Transaction Cost Engineer, 69 Fordham L Rev 31, 52 (2000) (describing how drafting hid-
den contractual terms impacts lawyers’ reputations even when they are actually advanc-
ing clients’ interests); Scott Edward Walker, Top 10 Reasons Why Entrepreneurs Hate 
Lawyers (Venture Hacks, Jan 14, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/256G-BU2M (includ-
ing “overlawyering” by using a “one-size-fits-all approach to deals” in a list of reasons why 
entrepreneurs hate lawyers). 
 96 Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World at 188 (cited in note 8). 
 97 Id. 
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a Goldilocks solution. But it was “very hard to locate the lawyers 
who know how to think like that.”98 
The former general counsel of Tumblr, Ari Shahdadi, describ-
ing Tumblr’s terms of service (TOS) revision process (about which 
I say more in Part III.A), noted that “law firm feedback was be-
yond useless, as their assessment of risks is way off and they can’t 
really balance the interests of users” and that “[n]o law firms are 
good at this.”99 When asked what institutional barriers exist to 
widespread use of precatory consumer contracts, he squarely laid 
the blame at the feet of the bar: 
[D]ecaying and venal legal institutions [ ] surround US com-
panies and don’t highlight the benefits (and low risks) of 
user-friendly contracts—a federal judiciary that routinely 
kowtows to concentrated financial power (ergo allowing class 
action waivers and mandatory arb[itration] clauses), a cor-
rupt and self-interested bar that invests in inefficiency and 
hooks for meritless plaintiffs’ suits, that same bar being in-
sanely overly conservative on the defense/advice side to pro-
tect their inefficient and exorbitant fee structures, etc.100 
Similarly, Michal Rosenn, the former general counsel of 
Kickstarter, suggested that outside law firms have a “very law-
yerly risk averse approach” and that, as a consequence, they are 
likely to avoid changes to consumer-facing terms. This is true 
both in traditional “Biglaw” and in firms that serve entrepre-
neurs: general counsel, by virtue of being embedded in the busi-
ness, develop a healthier appetite for risk-taking and a sense of 
the relative unimportance of small-bore legal problems.101 
Etsy’s representatives, when prompted to reflect on barriers 
to change, also mentioned risk aversion as a driver, though not 
standing alone: 
It’s hard to know for sure why other companies haven’t [in-
novated], but there are certainly costs associated with 
making significant changes to user policies. Some of those 
 
 98 Id at 190. 
 99 Email from Ari Shahdadi to David A. Hoffman (Mar 22, 2017, 3:08 pm EDT) 
(“Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm”) (on file with author). 
 100 Email from Ari Shahdadi to David A. Hoffman (Mar 22, 2017, 5:45 pm EDT) 
(“Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm”) (on file with author). 
 101 Telephone Interview with Michal Rosenn (Mar 24, 2017) (“Interview with Michal 
Rosenn”) (on file with author). 
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costs—in-house counsel’s time, translation, and outside coun-
sel review—are relatively concrete and easy to quantify. Oth-
ers, such as the risks of attracting unwanted attention from 
users or plaintiff’s counsel or omitting some crucial piece of 
legal language, are harder to evaluate. But we suspect that 
some combination of cost sensitivity and risk aversion is re-
sponsible for many companies[’] continued use of more old-
fashioned policies.102 
As a lawyer who worked at Etsy on its terms of use project 
lamented, outside counsel “will never give you what you want[.] 
[Y]ou have to hold the pen . . . [because] [t]hey focus on magic 
words.”103 
It is possible that American lawyers—and the law schools 
that produce them—are to blame for the failure of consumer con-
tracts to offer anything beyond option values for firms. It might 
be that in a world in which lawyers were forced to directly com-
pete against other sorts of professional services, consumer con-
tracts would be better tailored to firms’ needs (though the 
examples we see from less regulated jurisdictions don’t compel 
that point).104 But there are also reasons to be skeptical about an 
account that posits that lawyers are entirely to blame. 
First, though it is true that the worst thing you can say about 
a legal argument is that it is creative, it’s nonsense to deny the 
existence of legal innovations, even in the context of consumer 
contract fine print. For example, in the mid-1990s, Alan 
Kaplinsky, a Philadelphia-based big-firm lawyer, invented the 
class action waiver in a consumer contract.105 That innovation 
created enormous value for his clients.106 Other lawyers built on 
 
 102 Email from Bonnie Broeren, Head of Policy, Etsy, to David A. Hoffman (Mar 28, 
2017, 2:17 pm EDT) (“Email from Bonnie Broeren, 2:17 pm”) (on file with author), quoting 
Matthew Glick, Senior Product and Commercial Counsel, Etsy. 
 103 Telephone Interview with Hissan Bajwa, former senior counsel, Etsy (Apr 4, 2017) 
(“Interview with Hissan Bajwa”) (on file with author). 
 104 Notably, though lawyers abroad face fewer barriers to competition, they have not 
produced (to my knowledge) distinctively communicative legal terms. That’s true, 
although “new types of business models for legal work” are flourishing, including “joint 
venture[s] between lawyers, software engineers, and business experts.” Hadfield, Rules 
for a Flat World at 241–45 (cited in note 8) (offering a description of the UK’s deregulatory 
system). 
 105 Chris Mondics, A Pioneer in the Class Action Lawsuit Tug-of-War (Philly.com, Nov 
11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K6KC-2GWG. 
 106 For a general discussion of the value of contractual innovation, see Kevin E. Davis, 
Contracts as Technology, 88 NYU L Rev 83, 88–97 (2013) (discussing how innovation in 
contracts can beneficially change parties’ behavior). 
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Kaplinsky’s invention, eventually (through a deliberate strategy 
of creation and refinement) creating a clause for AT&T that ap-
plied waivers to arbitration in a way that survived Supreme 
Court review.107 
Second, many firms have apparently succeeded in communi-
cating with their users using governance documents. They’ve 
done so by moving from “contract” to “policy.” As Professor Eric 
Goldman argued in 2008: 
[B]ehavioral restrictions that do not need to be specifically 
barred in the user agreement can be moved into a separate 
statement of community norms/standards. This way, users 
are told what they can do and not do, but the statement does 
not have the force of law. Ideally, other users can be given 
tools to help them enforce the community norms. Even bet-
ter, the norms can be posted on a wiki so that the site’s users 
can help update them as the site’s community evolves. 
 
. . . 
 
[A] separate non-legal document may be a more effective tool 
to communicate site expectations than embedding those 
rules in a user agreement that no one will read.108 
Such guidelines are now commonly used to regulate user con-
duct in contexts in which firms find such regulation to be im-
portant.109 The relationship between nonbinding guidelines and 
 
 107 See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral 
Amendments, 57 UCLA L Rev 605, 654–56 (2010) (explaining how AT&T has changed its 
class arbitration waiver clause over time, seeking to create a version that is upheld by 
courts). See also AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 563 US 333, 340, 352 (2011) (holding 
that the California Supreme Court’s rule, which had resulted in AT&T’s arbitration waiver 
being found “unconscionable,” was preempted by federal law). 
 108 Eric Goldman, Lori Drew Conviction Reflections, Part 3 of 3: Lessons for Cyber-
Lawyers Drafting User Agreements (Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Dec 16, 2008), 
archived at http://perma.cc/4DDE-5T44. 
 109 An example is a firm that Professor Goldman once worked with—Nextdoor. The 
site’s “community guidelines” effectively contain a series of norms that don’t read as sim-
ple rehashed terms of use. Community Guidelines (Nextdoor, Dec 7, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AV66-E36H. Another example is the intellectual property guidelines at 
Vimeo, which were developed by the community team at that firm—with oversight from 
legal—to create a communicatively rich way to explain to users the intellectual property 
rules that the site wanted to enforce. Help Center/Vimeo Guidelines (Vimeo, 2018), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/NP4B-PDPD. As the firm’s general counsel pointed out to me, 
the firm in those guidelines uses phrases and a tone (“Don’t be a creep”) that it would 
never use in its terms of use. Interview with Ed Ferguson and Michael Cheah (cited in 
note 83). 
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terms of use is an interesting one. It seems that as firms grow 
larger and more complex, it becomes ever more difficult to main-
tain the separation: the policies increasingly refer back to their 
enabling contracts, reducing the acoustic separation that gave the 
former their communicative push. The result is that, at least for 
some firms, using consumer contracts to shape behavior would 
seem to be a useful innovation. 
The next Part identifies a few firms that seem to have exper-
imented in this vein. 
III.  COMMUNICATING THROUGH CONTRACTS 
So far, I have described fine print that was traditional in both 
form and placement. That is, it wasn’t frontloaded in the contract 
but rather placed somewhere in its guts, and it looked and 
sounded like it was written by and for lawyers. I’ve suggested that 
conventional explanations for this phenomenon rest on either be-
lieving that there’s simply insufficient demand for communicative 
terms to make them worthwhile to produce or that, while demand 
exists, the market fails to match it because of the bar’s monopoly. 
In this Part, I provide some examples that together suggest 
these prevailing accounts are, if not wrong, then at least incom-
plete. Sometimes, firms create fine print that at least sounds like 
it was written by a human. Whether these counterexamples pro-
vide the exception to the rule, or its undoing, is a subject I take 
on later in the Article. 
Consider Bumble, a dating app, which functions somewhat 
like the better-known Tinder, except that women must initiate 
conversations. Indeed, the app was founded by Whitney Wolfe, 
who had previously helped to start Tinder.110 Bumble’s terms and 
conditions, like those of many other modern firms, control intel-
lectual property rights and regulate user behavior. But Bumble’s 
approach sounds different. It begins with a jaunty paragraph: 
Hey guys! Welcome to Bumble’s Terms and Conditions of Use 
(these “Terms”). Our lawyers insist that we impose rules on 
users to protect all of our hard work. This is a contract be-
tween you and Bumble Trading Inc and we want you to know 
yours and our rights before you use the Bumble application 
 
 110 Leora Yashari, Meet the Tinder Co-Founder Trying to Change Online Dating 
Forever (Vanity Fair, Aug 7, 2015), online at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2015/08/ 
bumble-app-whitney-wolfe (visited Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
1422 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1395 
 
(“App”). Please take a few moments to read these Terms be-
fore enjoying the App, because once you access, view or use 
the App, you are going to be legally bound by these Terms (so 
probably best to read them first!).111 
And the rest of the terms, though substantively identical to 
those of a thousand other sites, are interspersed with exclamation 
points and snark. Some of the wording explicitly attempts to re-
mind users of offline norms of courtesy and reciprocity: 
Also, we don’t appreciate users doing bad things to Bumble— 
we’ve worked hard on our creation, so scraping or replicating 
any part of the App without our prior consent is expressly 
prohibited.112 
The eleventh section of the terms, headed “Miscellaneous,” is 
introduced as follows: “Firstly, those standard clauses at the end 
of most contracts (boring, we know).”113 After users have agreed 
that the terms may be unilaterally modified, the terms then flag 
that “[s]ome more legal mumbo jumbo” is on its way, including a 
waiver of class action relief and choice of forum clauses, all pre-
sented in their original legal language.114 
Later, I return to Bumble’s story; for now, consider how dif-
ferent such terms sound from the ordinary drone of end-user 
license agreements (EULAs) that you haven’t read. (To remind 
yourself what that drone sounds like, take a look at iTunes’s 
EULA, as it’s likely at hand.) To the extent that you found 
Bumble’s terms refreshing, consider the incentive structures that 
produced them. Doesn’t everyone now agree that no one reads 
consumer contracts and they are, at best, a series of weak option 
clauses? If that’s true, what could drive Bumble (and other 
firms)115 to create terms that are moderately funny and easier to 
parse?116 
 
 111 Terms and Conditions of Use (Bumble, Sept 6, 2017) (“Bumble Terms and 
Conditions”), archived at http://perma.cc/R9GT-N2MS. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See, for example, Terms of Use (Netflix, Aug 1, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4VRU-FV7E (beginning its terms of use with the possibly disarming, or at 
least chipper, exhortation: “Welcome to Netflix!”); Jet Terms of Use (Jet, Sept 12, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/CK9J-RXZH (“We apologize for the all-caps shouting we’re 
about to do, but these parts are important. (*takes deep breath*)”). 
 116 To be precise, they are law school funny. 
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To answer that question, I talked with numerous partici-
pants in the consumer contracts industry and was led to focus on 
a few platform economy firms that have written terms that ap-
pear to actually seek to communicate with, and influence, their 
users.117 Through a series of semistructured interviews, I asked 
general counsel at Tumblr, Kickstarter, and Etsy, as well as 
AirBnb and Bumble, how they came to write the terms they did 
and what they sought to gain.118 All are businesses that rely on 
participation by users, and all have cultivated relationships with 
their “community” that revolve, to one degree or another, around 
trust.119 So let us examine the mass contracts they created. 
A. Tumblr: Because They Cared 
Consider first the case of Tumblr. Ari Shahdadi, describing 
his work as the general counsel at Tumblr, listed this revision of 
the TOS as one of his great successes.120 When he arrived on the 
job in May 2011, he thought the TOS “need[ed] to get re-written. 
. . . It was not in keeping with [ ] the trust relationship that David 
 
 117 There are, of course, other firms with excellent, communicative terms. The 
examples here are not intended to be exclusive, but rather the result of the limits of my 
contacts. For discussion of Pinterest, see Elizabeth Townsend Gard and Bri Whetstone, 
Copyright and Social Media: A Preliminary Case Study of Pinterest, 31 Miss C L Rev 249, 
270–75 (2012) (describing Pinterest’s evolution of its terms and summarizing that 
“[e]ssentially the Terms of Service are the same [as a previous iteration], with one notable 
difference: the new Terms can actually be understood by the average user”). An old (but 
still well-known) example is Borland’s “No-Nonsense License Statement,” which urged 
users to treat the software “just like a book.” Thom Holwerda, Borland in the 1980s: “Treat 
Software Just Like a Book” (OSNews, Oct 15, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/CRH3 
-LQ6P. See also Terms of Service (500px), archived at http://perma.cc/WWW8-GYHA (pre-
senting terms of use in two columns: the legal language on the left and a section headed 
“Basically” on the right containing a paraphrased version). 
 118 A semistructured interview follows a “general outline of the topics to be covered 
during the interview but is free to follow the flow of the interview in deciding when and 
how to pursue each thread.” Robert M. Lawless, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, and Thomas S. 
Ulen, Empirical Methods in Law 73 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed 2016). They can be particularly 
helpful in interviewing attorneys. I interviewed Etsy’s policy team and Tumblr’s former 
general counsel by email and conducted all other conversations by phone. I sent a prelim-
inary draft of this Article to the sources and offered them an opportunity to correct any 
direct quotes and suggest changes to my interpretation. (I incorporated all edits to direct 
quotes from interviews and some of the suggested changes to interpretation.) Each inter-
view or email exchange focused on four basic topics: Why did the firm come to create the 
terms it did, what was the process of their drafting, what barriers did they face, and how 
did they measure or evaluate success? 
 119 Sharing economy firms are typically built on trust between strangers. See, for ex-
ample, Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1634 (cited in note 8). 
 120 Ari Shahdadi, I Fought the Law and the Law Won (Lawyerin’, Sept 25, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/CUJ6-ZMPX. 
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[Karp, Tumblr’s founder,] had built with the user base. So that 
was [ ] on my list [ ] day one.”121 Here are what Tumblr’s terms (in 
part) looked like before the edit: 
FIGURE 1:  TUMBLR TOS (2010)122 
 
Shahdadi and his team saw the consumers of Tumblr’s EULA 
as “entrepreneurs, inventors, [and] creators.”123 The mission of the 
general counsel’s office was to find “the right thing to do” and then 
“advocate for that, but we also give our users a way for them to 
express how they feel if they . . . want to.”124 Indeed, both 
Shahdadi and Karp report that changing the terms to make them 
user-friendly was a “basic moral imperative,” in part because the 
site was “very focused on creators.”125 They generated terms 
through an iterative process: 
[W]e expected [the users] to read the TOS (and interrogate 
us on any changes that were suspect). Part of that process 
was previewing TOS and policy changes and asking for feed-
back before launching them—which I personally responded 
to (and it was good feedback). In general we had established 
 
 121 Jenna Matecki, Episode 029: Ari Shahdadi on Measuring Success through Impact 
33:56–34:09 (Notes on Doing Podcast, Apr 18, 2016), online at http://notesondoing.com/ 
029-ari-shahdadi/ (visited Feb 25, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 122 Terms of Service (Tumblr, Mar 3, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/MK7P-XHUD. 
 123 Randy Milch, GC at Tumblr: Legal Issues Faced by the Digital Publishing Platform 
29:02–29:33 (In-House Legal Podcast, Aug 19, 2015), online at http://legaltalknet 
work.com/podcasts/in-house-legal/2015/08/gc-tumblr-legal-issues-faced-digital-publishing 
platform/ (visited Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm (cited in note 100). 
2018] Relational Contracts of Adhesion 1425 
 
a relationship of trust between company and user in a num-
ber of ways and the TOS & policies were the written instan-
tiation of that trust. I’d liken it to basic institution-building, 
something companies are usually awful at. This is why I 
didn’t, e.g., include one of those stupid class-action waivers 
or a mandatory arb[itration] clause even though they were 
considered “legal innovations” by the second update I did to 
the documents. 
 
It’s the difference between “corporate social responsibility” as 
BS marketing and actually caring about your users/ 
customers.126 
Tumblr’s process was curated at the highest levels of the 
firm. Shahdadi drafted the terms (with the help of law professor 
Eric Goldman), and Karp annotated them.127 
Tumblr’s revised TOS are notable for their translations of 
legal terms. For example, the service, as is typical, mandates: “No 
individual under the age of thirteen (13) may use the Services, 
provide any personal information to Tumblr, or otherwise submit 
personal information through the Services.”128 Under that prohi-
bition, in a shaded box, Tumblr helpfully glosses: 
FIGURE 2:  TUMBLR TOS: AGE PROHIBITION (2016)129 
 
Similarly, Tumblr provides a precisely worded obligation with 
multiple different examples of how users can behave maliciously 
with respect to the service, coupled with a shaded explanation: 
 
 126 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm (cited in note 99). See also Ammori, 127 Harv 
L Rev at 2273 (cited in note 32) (describing Shahdadi’s willingness to send an email to 
every user who commented on the proposed changes to the TOS). 
 127 See Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm (cited in note 99) (“[W]e went in fully know-
ing the risk that a court would integrate [the annotations] with the document.”). 
 128 Terms of Service (Sept 8, 2016) (“Tumblr TOS, 2016”), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
D666-4U8G. 
 129 Id. 
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FIGURE 3:  TUMBLR TOS: MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR (2016)130 
 
Like the platform precatory terms I described earlier, Tumblr 
insists that “[y]ou agree to provide Tumblr with accurate, com-
plete, and updated registration information, particularly your 
email address.”131 But unlike them, Tumblr then justifies the in-
junction in another shaded paragraph: 
FIGURE 4:  TUMBLR TOS: EMAIL WARNING (2016)132 
 
After the new terms rolled out, Shahdadi celebrated the re-
sponse to them: 
[I don’t have quantitative] data but I know they were read—
people were turning them into memes when we launched 
them. We had a bunch of “fake news” misinterpretations of 
the terms as well, but our own users fought those off because 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Tumblr TOS, 2016 (cited in note 128). 
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they knew we had their backs. We also forced a click-through 
in a pop-up or lightbox when we did the update to make sure 
people at least knew the terms were being updated.133 
Shahdadi claims that the site made the updated terms con-
spicuous “to genuinely make sure people saw them—but it also 
ended up being great marketing.”134 He believes that user-friendly 
terms on the margins produce few real legal risks. (“I took the 
indemnification provision out—who the heck ever seeks indem-
nity from a user? It would tank the business.”)135 At the same 
time, “it built real trust in the company and company manage-
ment.”136 But these cost-benefit calculations were, in Shahdadi’s 
view, secondary to the firm’s motivation, which was intrinsic: “be-
cause we care(d).”137 
Shahdadi also suggests that the business case for friendly 
and precatory contracts is not obvious for all firms. Though being 
user-friendly “is still surely a net positive,” the advantages to be-
ing able to exploit consumers’ data through contract terms are 
also undeniable: they make the “marginal consideration [of user-
friendliness] worthless as it is incredibly hard to build and main-
tain . . . one of these [social media] platform businesses at this 
point [outside of Google/Apple/Facebook’s orbit].”138 
B. Kickstarter: Reflecting Its Values 
Kickstarter is a well-known crowdfunding platform that al-
lows backers to support creators’ projects by pledging money to 
their campaigns in exchange for rewards.139 Kickstarter reincor-
porated as a public benefit corporation under Delaware law in 
2016.140 Its terms were last revised in 2014, as a part of a project 
to make the entire site more transparent and easy to access.141 
 
 133 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm (cited in note 99). 
 134 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm (cited in note 100). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm (cited in note 100). 
 139 See Our Mission Is to Help Bring Creative Projects to Life (Kickstarter, 2018), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/R7CR-RTKE. 
 140 Yancey Strickler, Perry Chen, and Charles Adler, Kickstarter Is Now a Benefit 
Corporation (Kickstarter Blog, Sept 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/54NC-2TM4 
(announcing Kickstarter’s incorporation as a public benefit corporation and explaining 
that “Benefit Corporations are for-profit companies that are obligated to consider the im-
pact of their decisions on society, not only shareholders”). 
 141 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101). 
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Indeed, Kickstarter’s public benefit corporation charter now ex-
plicitly requires the firm to operate in a way that “reflect[s] its 
values” and, further, mandates that its “terms of use and privacy 
policies will be clear, fair, and transparent. Kickstarter will not 
cover every possible future contingency, or claim rights and pow-
ers just because it can or because doing so is industry standard.”142 
As a part of the term revision process, Kickstarter’s general 
counsel, Michal Rosenn, asked an intern to distinguish, in the 
firm’s existing (and standard) terms and conditions, the content 
that was necessary and core to the company’s needs from the ad-
ditional detritus. Rosenn deliberately decided to pare down the 
terms while not asserting protections that added little business 
value—forced arbitration and class action waivers, for instance—
in part because they seemed like an overreach of power.143 
Rosenn and a nonlawyer then worked to redraft the existing 
terms to make them clear and jargon free. They had seen 
Tumblr’s terms of use (and indeed Kickstarter is a part of the 
same small community of New York–based startups, originally 
funded by the same venture firm, that use the same outside coun-
sel).144 Like Tumblr, Kickstarter created simple, easy-to-read 
summaries of each section of its terms of use and framed them in 
bright blue boxes at the beginning of each section. It begins: 
 
 142 Charter (Kickstarter, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/PJQ3-PH3B. Rosenn, 
noting that the charter postdated the revision, suggested that the former’s language re-
flected the firm’s motivation and attitude during the reform process. Interview with 
Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101). 
 143 In fact, the terms of use operative from 2012 to 2014 did not contain an arbitration 
clause, though they did contain a choice of forum clause (New York). Terms of Use 
(Kickstarter, Oct 2012) (“Kickstarter Terms of Use, 2012”), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PRU5-NRH9. 
 144 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). 
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FIGURE 5:  KICKSTARTER TERMS OF USE: SUMMARY (2014)145 
 
 
Like many sites, for example, Kickstarter requires users to 
avoid bad behavior. But its Dos and Don’ts section begins, again, 
with a blue box that contains the following text: “This section is a 
list of things you probably already know you shouldn’t do—lie, 
break laws, abuse people, steal data, hack other people’s comput-
ers, and so on. Please behave yourself. Don’t do this stuff.”146 
Rosenn reports that the translation provided reputational 
benefits for Kickstarter as well as an improved relationship with 
users.147 The major substantive change in the terms clarified the 
responsibilities and expectations of creators and backers when it 
comes to funding projects: the old (buried) language inaccurately 
overpromised refunds, and Kickstarter wanted to better reflect 
the practices and expectations around funding on the site.148 
Given those goals, it’s helpful to compare the old and the new 
versions of the same provision. First, the operative terms as they 
existed from 2012 through 2014: 
 
 145 Terms of Use (Kickstarter, Oct 19, 2014) (“Kickstarter Terms of Use, 2014”), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/V98K-8U7R. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101). 
 148 See Sarah Perez, Kickstarter Updates Terms of Use Section Related to Failed 
Projects (Techcrunch, Sept 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/MZ76-BKKD; Casey 
Johnston, Kickstarter Lays Down New Rules for When a Project Fails (ArsTechnica, Sept 
21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/PHH2-3XVH. 
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FIGURE 6:  KICKSTARTER TERMS OF USE: OPERATIVE TERMS 
(2012–2014)149 
 
These terms leave significant ambiguity about what happens 
if projects fail. Talk of “good faith attempt” and “Project Creators 
 
 149 Kickstarter Terms of Use, 2012 (cited in note 143). 
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are required to . . . refund any Backer” contrasts with disclaim-
ers that “Kickstarter does not offer refunds.”150 The revised 
terms (as of 2014), by contrast, break out the responsibilities of 
backers and creators. Here is the language on backers (which is, 
for our purposes, key): 
FIGURE 7:  KICKSTARTER TERMS OF USE: BACKERS (2014)151 
 
 
 150 Id. 
 151 Kickstarter Terms of Use, 2014 (cited in note 145). 
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The revision makes much clearer what rights are reserved: 
the language is cleaner and the font easier to parse. It’s conse-
quently not implausible to believe that (according to Rosenn) 
users sent positive feedback about the change, and Kickstarter 
has seen fewer questions from users as well.152 Moreover, backers, 
who communicate with creators, rely on and cite the terms of use 
frequently, suggesting that they have real uptake.153 
C. Etsy: Handcrafted Terms 
A third site is Etsy, also a community for which user buy-in 
is crucial to the business model. Etsy, like Kickstarter, decided to 
translate existing terms of use that were “just as generic and ugly 
as every other generic terms of service out there.”154 Indeed, they 
began with a dreaded block of ALLCAPS text: 
FIGURE 8:  ETSY TERMS OF USE: INTRODUCTION (2013)155 
 
 
 152 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). Bajwa was previously senior 
counsel at Etsy and the founder and CEO of SpotlessCity. 
 155 Terms of Use (Etsy, Nov 15, 2013) (“Etsy Terms of Use, 2013”), archived at 
http://perma.cc/P8US-EW25. 
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The change was initiated by a lawyer at the company, Hissan 
Bajwa (who is now general counsel at another startup). Bajwa 
noted that the existing terms were dissonant with the mission 
and look of the rest of Etsy’s trade dress: 
We use the word handcrafted a lot. . . . [A]ll these other teams 
are spending all this time making their pieces of the com-
pany—their turf—look and feel and reflect who we believe we 
are as a company. . . . We the legal team are looking like robot 
lawyers drafting all these legalistic documents that were a 
nightmare for our community members to work off of. That’s 
where it came from.156 
Bajwa, with the permission of the firm’s then–general coun-
sel, began by working on the key document, the terms of use. He 
decided to “[t]ear it up and start over.”157 But because of the 
relationship of that document to other contracts, the project 
quickly expanded. He joined with Bonnie Broeren, who heads 
Etsy’s policy team. Their first goal was to create a unique style 
guide on how to write its terms and conditions. The objective of 
that guide was (according to the people who worked on it) to 
“write policies that are enforceable from a legal perspective, but 
still human and accessible from a member perspective.”158 An en-
tire section of that guide was dedicated to voice, with instructions 
on how to write legal terms. To create the guide, Etsy’s lawyers 
worked with “product, engineering and design teams to see what 
would be possible.”159 The resulting product is a balance of text on 
the page and headings that had an “impactful presence on the 
page.”160 
As Bajwa pointed out, it’s rare for lawyers to have access to 
engineering resources. In Etsy’s case, the resources were fortui-
tously available: 
[The] internal tools team was working [at that very time] on 
improving our blog and our education content. We thought 
hold on a second, you are making the seller handbook look and 
 
 156 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Email from Bonnie Broeren, Head of Policy, Etsy, to David A. Hoffman (Mar 27, 
2017, 11:09 am EDT) (“Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am”) (on file with author); 
Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103) (“We came up with this style guide or 
lexicon so that [the house rules] will be treated as a unit, . . . in the same voice.”). 
 159 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158). 
 160 Id. 
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feel better. Why don’t we piggyback on that work and give us 
a little bit of custom design and graphics? . . . Once [we] 
frame[d] it as this is very important to our customer service 
team to reduce their workload, it is hard to argue against it.161 
The joint team unified the various policies into a single inte-
grated system: Etsy’s “house rules.”162 Today, those house rules 
have a distinctive look and feel. Section and paragraph headers 
are in plain and clear English: “Be honest with us,” “Let’s be clear 
about our relationship,” “Rights You Grant Etsy,” and “Don’t 
Steal Our Stuff.”163 And with respect to particular provisions, Etsy 
explains why it needs the rights it does, particularly the intellec-
tual property rights it takes.164 
Thus, compare the pre- and postlicensing rules. The prerevi-
sion section starts with a negative (“does not claim ownership”) 
and then provides a lengthy license description, with an embed-
ded link to a privacy policy: 
FIGURE 9:  ETSY TERMS OF USE: LICENSE DESCRIPTION (2013)165 
 
 
 161 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). 
 162 Terms of Use (Etsy, Jan 2, 2018) (“Etsy Terms of Use, 2018”), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L53G-HHQ2. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See id. 
 165 Etsy Terms of Use, 2013 (cited in note 155). 
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The same section postrevision is more colloquial, and it starts 
with affirmative claims (“[c]ontent that you post using our 
Services is your content”) and concrete examples.166 It refers to 
norms of behavior (responsibility) rather than exclusively to legal 
rules. And, notably, it first provides a nonlegal version of the 
rules, then a legal version, and then a justification. The result is 
a set of rights that aren’t substantively different but that are 
more clearly explained: 
FIGURE 10:  ETSY TERMS OF USE (REVISED)167 
 
 
 166 Etsy Terms of Use, 2018 (cited in note 162). 
 167 Id. 
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This sense of translation is made more explicit by actual il-
lustrations of the terms. For example, Etsy demonstrates the re-
quirement that sellers list handmade items for sale with the fol-
lowing illustration: 
FIGURE 11:  ETSY ILLUSTRATION168 
 
Etsy tested these changes in two ways. It created different 
versions of the policies with a tool called “Etsy Impressions,” 
which showed sellers particular policies and asked them to high-
light sections and give the firm feedback.169 It also ran focus 
groups with sellers and invited feedback on the changed policies. 
In so doing, the team proposed to “make sure the people who will 
be bound by our policies actually understand them.”170 
After the terms rolled out, the policy team measured their 
success by talking to support teams to see if particular provisions 
were creating friction or resolving it, by monitoring user commu-
nication with each other, and by looking at how Etsy’s terms were 
described in the press.171 Broeren, cautioning that Etsy’s support 
teams still field complaints and concerns from users, noted: 
We did . . . see our members positively discussing our policies 
in our forums, mentioning that they trusted us more than 
some of our competitors as a result of our easy-to-read poli-
cies. We also saw some positive press coverage. Regarding 
our customer support teams, I would say that incorporating 
 
 168 Handmade Policy (Etsy, Feb 22, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4642-HHL4. 
Etsy hoped that “fun illustrations” would “clarify what we were saying in the accompany-
ing text.” Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158). 
 169 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158). 
 170 Id. 
 171 See id. 
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their perspectives is critical to our success as we continue to 
tweak our policies. They are usually on the front lines of any 
member dissatisfaction.172 
And, according to Bajwa, though it is hard to articulate a 
monetary return for the revision, the site’s users appeared less 
confused and more likely to rely on their own reading of the terms 
to guide conduct, and the internal customer support workers were 
less frustrated with the legal department as a result.173 
D. Airbnb: Solving a Public Relations Crisis 
Airbnb, the short-term rental site, had a problem. Three re-
searchers had shown that guest applications with distinctively 
African American names were less likely to be accepted by hosts, 
and they argued that the platform’s design facilitated that out-
come.174 Rob Chesnut, in his second week as general counsel of the 
company, was quickly put on his back foot: having not anticipated 
the issue, “we were forced to take it on reactively, [which is] not 
the ideal way to do it.”175 Chesnut reports that the firm was a bit 
surprised by the issue because “our founders and company are in 
[S]an Francisco, [which is] culturally very tolerant.”176 But once 
the issue “blew up,” the firm had to decide what to do.177 
One option, according to Chesnut, would be the “standard 
legal approach” as a platform: disclaiming responsibility for 
renters’ behavior.178 Instead, the company decided the right op-
tion was to declare that “we own this, we want to be better than 
this. . . . We’re not going to be driven by legal issues here. We’re 
going to be driven by what’s important to our mission and our 
community.”179 Chesnut wrote a first draft of an entirely new non-
discrimination policy, carved out of the existing TOS to “call it 
 
 172 Email from Bonnie Broeren, Head of Policy, Etsy, to David A. Hoffman (May 26, 
2017, 2:22 pm EDT) (“Email from Bonnie Broeren, 2:22 pm”) (on file with author). 
 173 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). 
 174 See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca, and Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in 
the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 9 Am Econ J: Applied Econ 1, 
2–3 (2017). 
 175 Telephone Interview with Rob Chesnut, General Counsel, Airbnb (Apr 14, 2017) 
(“Interview with Rob Chesnut”) (on file with author). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175). 
1438 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1395 
 
out.”180 That draft’s goal was to “sound authentic and human” ra-
ther than lawyerly.181 
Chesnut sent the draft to two well-known lawyers, Eric 
Holder (the former US attorney general) and John Relman, a cru-
sading civil rights and housing lawyer, both of whom played a key 
role in its drafting process.182 As Chesnut noted, the two lawyers 
and their respective teams “each worked on different elements of 
[the policy]. . . . In the end, we came up with something that is 
very Airbnb. It’s not crafted by lawyers for legal protection.”183 
The policy itself is, indeed, straightforward and written in a 
clear and accessible style. Unlike the earlier examples I discuss, 
there are no visual cues or callouts: Chesnut specifically described 
“an effort to be authentic, but not legalese, but not cute. There 
was an intentional effort to keep it simple.”184 Thus, the terms 
permit and prohibit behavior, often in the same section: 
FIGURE 12:  AIRBNB NONDISCRIMINATION POLICY185 
 
 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. For discussion of Holder’s role at Airbnb, see David McCabe, Airbnb Enlists 
Civil Rights Leaders in Discrimination Fight (The Hill, Sept 11, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4NKK-XLRS; Brian Chesky, An Update on the Airbnb Anti-Discrimination 
Review (Airbnb, July 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/J6W3-ADW3. 
 183 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175). 
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 185 Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our Commitment to Inclusion and Respect 
(Airbnb), archived at http://perma.cc/TU6W-ZNLH. 
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The policy describes the prohibition on discrimination as an 
aspect of Airbnb’s mission of “bringing the world closer together 
by fostering meaningful, shared experiences among people from 
all parts of the world.”186 That is, like the preceding examples, 
Airbnb deliberately tried to align its brand with the terms to 
make them more persuasive. Generally speaking, Airbnb’s policy 
rollout resulted in positive press,187 though questions remain 
about whether it in fact alleviates implicit bias.188 
Chesnut stated that Airbnb did not test out different versions 
of the policy language, though it had been conducting experi-
ments on different placement of pictures and reviews to encour-
age user behavior that the firm desires.189 Though Airbnb re-
quired every user to click to agree to the policy, Chesnut 
acknowledged that the document itself would require continuous 
monitoring and tweaking through an internal compliance team 
that surfaces difficult cases and sends them to a committee tasked 
with refining the rules over time.190 
There has been a small (under 5 percent) loss in users, which 
Chesnut attributes to the policy.191 But Chesnut admitted that 
Airbnb has chosen not to conduct its own testing to see if users 
are discriminating in ways prohibited by the rules.192 Though the 
nondiscrimination policy “is particularly important,” looks differ-
ent from most terms and conditions, and comes “from the heart of 
the firm,” Airbnb’s legal response to discrimination appears in 
some ways to still be reactive.193 
 
 186 Id. 
 187 See, for example, Katie Benner, Airbnb Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination by 
Its Hosts (NY Times, Sept 8, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/ 
technology/airbnb-anti-discrimination-rules.html (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 188 See Ruomeng Cui, Jun Li, and Dennis J. Zhang, Discrimination with Incomplete 
Information in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from Field Experiments on Airbnb *25–26 
(Dec 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9QJH-ZMFN (finding evidence that discrimina-
tion persists even after the change in terms). 
 189 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. After I talked with Chesnut, the firm announced that it had reached a settle-
ment with a California regulator to allow the state to conduct such tests on its behalf. See 
Sam Levin, Airbnb Gives in to Regulator’s Demand to Test for Racial Discrimination by 
Hosts (The Guardian, Apr 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Q63W-XZEZ. 
 193 See Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175). 
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E. Bumble: We’re Not Tinder 
Finally, let’s return to Bumble’s funny terms. Bumble is 
sometimes described as the “feminist Tinder.”194 But according to 
Miranda Lerner, a lawyer who was involved with its legal opera-
tions at its founding, Bumble sought at its launch to distinguish 
itself from Tinder.195 Lerner (and Wolfe, Bumble’s founder) re-
solved to use the new app’s TOS as a differentiation engine. 
Lerner worked over several days with a team of younger 
paralegals and another in-house lawyer. They helped her design 
a set of terms that felt “young” and “cool.”196 The resulting lan-
guage was sent to a law firm that inserted more formal (“very le-
gal”) amendments.197 Over a month, that process iterated, with 
the aim of fusing together the desired tone with the exculpatory 
language that Bumble’s outside counsel required. Indeed, after 
the “mumbo jumbo” language that introduces this Part, Bumble’s 
terms do in fact revert to legalese: 
No failure or delay in exercising any right, power or privilege 
under the Terms shall operate as a waiver of such right or 
acceptance of any variation of the Terms and nor shall any 
single or partial exercise by either party of any right, power 
or privilege preclude any further exercise of the right or the 
exercise of any other right, power or privilege.198 
Were readers more likely to be guided by the framing around 
this passage?199 Lerner, an experienced entrepreneur and counse-
lor, acknowledged that individuals rarely if ever read the terms 
and conditions of any app—that the terms’ real audience (apart 
from courts) was journalists who might peruse them at the app’s 
 
 194 Jessica Bennet, With Her Dating App, Women Are in Control (NY Times, Mar 18, 
2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/fashion/bumble-feminist-dating-app 
-whitney-wolfe.html (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 195 Telephone Interview with Miranda Lerner (Jun 9, 2017) (“Interview with Miranda 
Lerner”) (on file with author). Lerner was Head of Legal at Bumble from 2014 through 
2016. The app launched during her tenure. Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Bumble Terms and Conditions (cited in note 111). 
 199 There is evidence that firms may motivate information acquisition by teasing mys-
teries. See, for example, Dina Mayzlin and Jiwoong Shin, Uninformative Advertising as 
an Invitation to Search, 30 Marketing Science 666, 680 (2011) (reporting experimental 
findings that vague advertising “may increase consumers’ likelihood to search for infor-
mation about the product”). But Bumble did the opposite: it suggested that there was 
nothing worth learning in the terms. 
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launch. That is, Bumble’s terms sounded different explicitly be-
cause of its branding strategy.200 
At launch, Bumble’s interesting terms may have helped con-
vince journalists that Bumble’s product was virtuous.201 Lerner 
pointed out that she knew of no backlash to Bumble’s terms and 
that the product was successfully made distinct. In this way, the 
terms “[p]rotect[ed the] brand from criticism.”202 At the same 
time, she argued that the clearly written terms helped the firm 
“argue [its] case back to [the] customer.”203 They did so by making 
the rights themselves clearer (thus leaving less room for interpre-
tative dispute). But also, by injecting humor, Lerner believes that 
the internal consumer service teams were better able to work out 
for themselves how to deal with complaints: they could send con-
sumers links to disarming terms rather than “piss[ing] them off 
with legal language.”204 
IV.  FROM OPTIONS TO RELATIONAL CONTRACTS OF ADHESION 
What can we learn from these case studies? At the gross level, 
they provide examples of commercially important platform econ-
omy firms that appear to be using mass-market contracts in novel 
ways. At the very least, those contracts are functioning as exten-
sions of the firms’ trade dress: they are more likely to (in Etsy’s 
words) “look and feel and reflect who we believe we are as a com-
pany.”205 But according to some of the drafters whose work we’ve 
studied, the terms’ ambition was larger: to actually enable user-
participants to more easily read, learn from, and work with the 
terms in resolving disputes with each other. That is, the terms 
were intended to regulate. 
Stepping back from the detail allows us to consider whether 
these distinctive contracting moments come together to illustrate 
a new way that some contracts might work in the sharing econ-
omy. I believe they do: mass-market contracts govern behavior by 
 
 200 See Interview with Miranda Lerner (cited in note 195). 
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making adhesive contracts extensions of the firm’s brand. These 
contracts take on relational and discrete attributes.206 They are a 
new phenomenon, what I call “relational contracts of adhesion.”207 
What the case studies do not do is provide a general theory 
explaining why it was these firms that innovated, nor do they do 
a very good job of predicting when innovation will next arise (if it 
does). After all, the vast majority of firms, including almost all 
new economy platform firms, have terms and conditions that are 
ordinary in form and function. The ultimate goal of this Part is to 
provide a set of research directions to help us better understand 
this space. Before doing so, I work to synthesize what we’ve 
learned so far. 
A. Branding and Mass-Market Contracts 
Most of the case studies started with a problem: a firm with 
hundreds of thousands or millions of counterparties wanted to af-
fect those individuals’ behavior without spending excessive time 
policing them. In each case, for various reasons, that behavioral 
problem fell into the lap of a lawyer who decided to adapt a tradi-
tionally inert form to a new use. To review: 
• Tumblr needed to find a way to embed its terms within the 
firm’s mission of motivating creative production by users.208 
• Kickstarter needed a way to better channel investor-users 
when their projects failed and thus reduce reputational blowback 
to the firm.209 
 
 206 For a general discussion of relational contracting, see generally Ian R. MacNeil, 
Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw U L Rev 877 (2000). See also 
Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va L Rev 1089, 
1091 (1981) (“A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reduc-
ing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.”). 
 207 Others, notably Professor Ethan Leib, have suggested that courts should evaluate 
consumer contracts using relational doctrines. See Ethan J. Lieb, What Is the Relational 
Theory of Consumer Form Contract?, in Jean Braucher, John Kidwell, and William C. 
Whitford, eds, Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the 
Empirical and the Lyrical 259, 277–80 (Hart 2013). Leib claims that such contracts func-
tion as bureaucratic plans that stand not on particular assent to terms but rather “con-
sensual entry into already legitimate relations.” Id at 269. He would police terms using the 
reasonable expectations doctrine. Id at 276. There is much in this work that I agree with, 
but of course my focus is different: adhesive contracts that are intended to be read and to 
influence ex ante behavior. 
 208 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm (cited in note 100). 
 209 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101). 
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• Etsy sought to decrease the likelihood of user behavior that 
reflected badly on the company because it was leading to friction 
with Etsy and a loss of the site’s ability to be a trusted platform.210 
• Airbnb needed to reduce user discrimination (or at least be 
plausibly seen as doing so).211 
The changes were substantive. For the first three firms, the 
changes involved abandoning or not taking up remedial limita-
tions and defenses to actions by users;212 for Airbnb, the changes 
increased the firm’s explicit responsibility for preventing discrim-
ination.213 By adding translations, each firm also took on the risk 
that a court would interpret the translated text differently from 
the “legal” text. 214 By avoiding new exculpatory clauses while also 
adding a layer of uncertainty to the judicial reception of existing 
terms, all four firms thus increased their formal legal exposure. 
At the same time, each explicitly worked to avoid legalese and 
focus on simple, declarative sentences. All except for Airbnb also 
presented the terms with some playful humor and informality, as 
well as some visual cues and displays. 
Bumble’s goals in creating its terms were different. Unlike 
the previous examples, it did not already have a user base, let 
alone one that participated as moneymaking participants on a 
“platform.” Rather, Bumble explicitly sought to use contract to 
distinguish and sharpen its brand.215 It did so by projecting youth 
and informality, perhaps hoping to convince key gatekeeping 
 
 210 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 2:22 pm (cited in note 172). 
 211 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175). 
 212 Etsy’s original and modified terms contained an arbitration provision, though the 
original terms provided for fees to the prevailing party while the modified terms did not. 
Compare Etsy Terms of Use, 2018 (cited in note 162), with Etsy Terms of Use, 2013 (cited 
in note 155). 
 213 See Part III.D. 
 214 Professor Curtis Anderson, formerly the general counsel of the Match Group (of 
Match.com and Tinder), told me that Match decided not to follow the Tumblr and Etsy 
model for terms because of a judgment that a two-track model for terms (and additional 
illustrations) added legal risk that courts would render important legal protections for the 
firm unenforceable. Telephone Interview with Curtis Anderson, Associate Teaching 
Professor, Brigham Young University Law School (Apr 20, 2017) (“Interview with Curtis 
Anderson”) (on file with author). 
 215 In addition to the Tinder relationship discussed above, I found reference in con-
temporaneous press to concerns about Bumble’s relationship to Badoo, a well-known 
European social networking and dating site that had been criticized for its privacy prac-
tices. See Steve O’Hear, Tinder Rival Bumble Is Majority-Owned by European Dating 
Behemoth Badoo (TechCrunch, Mar 25, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2H3E-945V. To 
the extent that Bumble wished to signal its distance from that criticism, informal terms 
would seem to have been a useful approach. 
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journalists to write stories that would emphasize that Bumble 
was a “feminist” dating app.216 
Thus, one key lesson is that firms are trying to enhance their 
brands using mass-market contracts.217 Indeed, by combining 
terms, tone, and look, firms can make their legal rules part of the 
firm’s trade dress.218 As Shahdadi pointed out, Tumblr’s playful 
approach to terms succeeded in grabbing attention on the web 
and branding the firm as a humane and trustworthy firm.219 At 
Etsy, it was the incongruence of ordinary terms with the site’s 
brand that motivated the project,220 and the team, justifying the 
new terms, claimed that they “can even provide a competitive ad-
vantage over other companies whose terms are more difficult to 
understand.”221 Airbnb’s general counsel noted that its revised 
policy was “very Airbnb,” both aesthetically and in terms of con-
gruence with its mission.222 
This trade dress–centered understanding of functional terms 
is not entirely novel. A famous example of cobranding using legal 
material comes from the online gaming firm Zynga. In the lead-
up to the firm’s initial public offering, it launched a social game 
through its website that taught users about its privacy policy and 
linked to reward chits that could be used in related games (like 
FarmVille).223 That gamification of the privacy rules received very 
positive coverage as well as laudatory attention in the world of 
 
 216 See Interview with Miranda Lerner (cited in note 195). 
 217 Others have suggested that contracts can serve a branding function, though not 
in the consumer context. See, for example, Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: 
Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12 Harv Negotiation L Rev 137, 153 (2007) (focusing on 
MasterCard’s transactional structuring as a form of brand enhancement); D. Gordon 
Smith, The “Branding Effect” of Contracts, 12 Harv Negotiation L Rev 189, 195–98 (2007) 
(discussing the information-conveying function of contracts in the venture capital context). 
 218 I mean this in the colloquial sense—I’m not sure that the TOS would meet the 
Lanham Act definition of trade dress, in part because they are functional. See Fair Wind 
Sailing, Inc v Dempster, 764 F3d 303, 309 (3d Cir 2014) (identifying elements of trade 
dress infringement, including that the infringing design be “nonfunctional”). 
 219 See, for example, Caroline Moss, Tumblr’s Hilarious New Legal Terms of Service 
Include a Ban on Pretending to Be Benedict Cumberbatch (Business Insider, Jan 30, 2014), 
online at http://www.businessinsider.com/tumblrs-new-terms-of-service-is-inspiring-and 
-funny-2014-1 (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). I am not arguing that 
the motivation for change by Shahdadi was primarily instrumental. I think he held a sin-
cere belief that it was, in fact, the right thing to do. Rather, he was able to justify his 
motivation in terms that spoke across constituencies. 
 220 See Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). 
 221 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158). 
 222 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175). 
 223 Julie Beck, Zynga Inc.: Game-ification, InsideCounsel 58 (Sept 2012). 
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privacy policy.224 According to Jay Monahan, the lawyer at Zynga 
most responsible for the product’s rollout, it also had three addi-
tional positive attributes. It helped to establish a positive 
relationship between the firm and the Federal Trade 
Commission,225 which had recently released a report on the im-
portance of privacy transparency.226 It increased readership of the 
underlying privacy policies.227 And, significantly for our purposes, 
it aligned with the firm’s mission and brand that games could be 
both entertaining and educational.228 
As others, notably Professor Danielle Citron, have suggested, 
firms can enforce their TOS in a way that signals their allegiance 
to larger social campaigns,229 highlighting virtues and thus gain-
ing reputational capital.230 For example, MySpace changed its 
TOS to ban certain kinds of speech and enforced those bans with 
aggressive moderation. These efforts helped the firm “by creating 
market niches and contributing to consumer goodwill.”231 Others, 
including Professor Robert Gomulkiewicz, have argued that firms 
should modulate the tone of their EULAs to “build goodwill with 
consumers.”232 But the idea that harmonizing the look and feel of 
terms can help make them functional has yet to be explored. 
Understanding how these terms work as extensions of the 
firm’s brand is jarring. There is something odd about the idea that 
hypermodern sharing economy firms try to advance their hipster 
credentials with that most antiquated behavioral tool of all: a con-
tract. Indeed, the message can be easily confused: Bumble says, 
on the one hand, “We’re relaxed and hip enough to say that law is 
bunk,” but on the other hand, “Our lawyers insist that you are 
 
 224 See, for example, Will Simonds, Getting from PrivacyVille to the Real World of Online 
Privacy (The Online Privacy Blog, July 8, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/8ZL7-W6AE 
(characterizing the gamified privacy policy as “an inspired step in the right direction”). 
 225 Telephone Interview with Jay Monahan (Jan 3, 2018) (“Interview with Jay 
Monahan”) (on file with author). 
 226 See Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid 
Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers (Dec 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2X5N-EPXB. 
 227 Interview with Jay Monahan (cited in note 225). 
 228 Id. 
 229 See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combatting Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 Mich L Rev 373, 412–13 (2009). 
 230 See Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace at 230–31 (cited in note 41). 
 231 Id at 229. 
 232 Gomulkiewicz, 12 Geo Mason L Rev at 696 (cited in note 86). 
1446 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1395 
 
bound by bunk.”233 Airbnb may be seeking to put out a public re-
lations fire by suggesting that it has a better way of communi-
cating with users (though, in reality, it may not actually care if 
users read the policy). Thus, there is an element of false con-
sciousness here: terms might be gaining user trust, and 
regulators’ approval, through a revision that in fact does little of 
substance. 
This dystopian vision of the sharing economy has been force-
fully advanced by Professor Ryan Calo, culminating in his coau-
thored exposé of Uber’s predatory behavior, Taking Economy.234 
Calo argues that, because firms have the opportunity to learn 
about users en masse and the motive to exploit their vulnerabili-
ties, we ought to be concerned lest actions that they take couched 
in the new economy’s language of freedom and choice confuse us 
about the reality of exploitation on the ground. Thus, one way to 
see the case studies I present is as wolfish firms successfully 
branding themselves as sheep.235 
While this story is plausible for some firms, it doesn’t really 
capture the phenomenon at work here. Apart from Bumble, and 
perhaps Airbnb, each of our case study firms increased its legal 
exposure to suits by making it harder (on the margins) to exercise 
defensive clauses. The lawyers I spoke to said that they were com-
fortable with this trade not only because of the benefits it secured 
in terms of user buy-in, but also because the change fit with a 
larger public brand that the firm was eager to extend. And, apart 
from Bumble, the lawyers pushing the change stressed their in-
ternal motivation to do the right thing as an important or moti-
vating factor in the particular sorts of choices that were made. 
 
 233 This relates to a point made by Citron about how vague TOS can dilute expressive 
messages. Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace at 231 (cited in note 41) (explaining that 
“[t]he more clearly and specifically companies explain those terms and the harms that 
they want to prevent, the better users will understand what is expected of them”). 
 234 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 Geo Wash L Rev 995, 1018 (2014) 
(“A firm with the resources and inclination will be in a position to surface and exploit how 
consumers tend to deviate from rational decisionmaking on a previously unimaginable 
scale.”); Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1623 (cited in note 8) (arguing that con-
tracting is a way that firms like Uber exploit their drivers). 
 235 See Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger, Re-Engineering Humanity ch 4 
(Cambridge 2018) (arguing that consumer contracts are shaping preferences in nefarious 
ways). 
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B. The Costs and Consequences of Innovations 
The firms provide different models for producing terms—
from one that was determined by lawyers (Kickstarter, Airbnb, 
and Bumble), to a collaboration between the general counsel and 
CEO with informal user feedback (Tumblr), to an interdiscipli-
nary team with regularized user feedback (Etsy).236 
These different processes reveal how the task of redrafting 
the fine print can have organizational consequences inside the 
firm. Revision of terms reveals something about firm culture: as 
Shahdadi says, “I would never farm this task out—it’s core to 
every company. . . . [N]ext time I would be more aggressive and 
do most of the work myself.”237 That is, when firms think about 
how to make precatory fine print functional, they might come to 
learn things about themselves. This organizing function of disclo-
sure is an important, but understudied, phenomenon. As 
Professor Peter Swire, explaining the beneficent effects of re-
quired financial privacy disclosures, puts it: 
I contend that a principal effect of the notices has been to 
require financial institutions to inspect their own practices. 
. . . In order to draft the notice, many financial institutions 
undertook an extensive process, often for the first time, to 
learn just how data is and is not shared between different 
parts of the organization and with third parties. Based on my 
extensive discussions with people in the industry, I believe 
that many institutions discovered practices that they de-
cided, upon deliberation, to change.238 
Arguably, this kind of focusing effect can be socially useful 
even if it isn’t terribly effective at directly changing behavior. The 
mere fact that the firm has thought about how to write terms that 
 
 236 See Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103) (“Unlike most or many con-
sumer sites, we have an active community and our sellers are an active community who 
read every word of this.”). See also Gomulkiewicz, 12 Geo Mason L Rev at 700–01 (cited in 
note 86) (arguing that, in the software industry, lawyers’ exclusive role in drafting terms 
hampers user-friendliness). 
 237 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm (cited in note 99). 
 238 Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 Minn 
L Rev 1263, 1316 (2002) (contending that disclosure requirements trigger self-
examination by firms). 
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tell users not to be obnoxious may influence it to invest more ef-
fort in how to prevent corrosive user conduct, leading to innova-
tions in page design.239 
For example, at Etsy, the revision process required the legal 
and policy team to talk with a variety of stakeholders within the 
firm. While the older terms had a “Frankensteinian” aspect, the 
new ones were designed to be coherent.240 Some of the conversa-
tions required translation of technical concepts (like the payment 
and direct checkout system).241 Though they got a “gut check” from 
outside counsel, the inside legal team spent a considerable 
amount of time trying to coordinate the views of diverse internal 
audiences and making sure they were on (literally) one page.242 
One question is whether it is possible to entirely outsource 
the project of producing functional precatory contracts. As it turns 
out, a firm called Snapterms tried, between 2011 and 2014, to sell 
terms with a sense of humor to small businesses with relatively 
simple consumer sales interfaces. It was marketed extensively, 
with features on popular websites, as a place where you could get 
semicustomizable terms for a fixed price.243 Over three years the 
firm sold 2,200 contracts, and around 10 percent of customers 
paid extra for humorous inserts.244 As an example, consider the 
site’s own description of its services: 
Snapterms is a legal service for people who don’t want to 
mortgage their house to hire a traditional law firm. 
Snapterms, in turn, consists of an elite team of lawyers who 
have made the career decision to whore ourselves out at bar-
gain basement prices. How do we keep prices so low? Well, 
we can’t really discuss trade secrets, but it involves a giant 
 
 239 See Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace at 232 (cited in note 41) (describing the 
Inter-Parliamentary Task Force on Internet Hate’s Anti-Cyberhate Working Group’s dis-
cussions about “developing guidelines that will help users better understand terms-of-
service requirements”). 
 240 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. In some ways, Etsy’s process followed the model process laid out by 
Gomulkiewicz for how one might design a user-friendly contract, though there is no evi-
dence that they knew of his work. See Gomulkiewicz, 12 Geo Mason L Rev at 703–05 (cited 
in note 86) (detailing the model process, which includes using an interdisciplinary team 
and creating terms that are cohesive, user-friendly, and well designed). 
 243 See Sarah Perez, SnapTerms: Terms of Service as a Service (TechCrunch, Apr 13, 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3XXC-KVPT. 
 244 Telephone Interview with Hansen Tong (Apr 27, 2017) (“Interview with Hansen 
Tong”) (on file with author). Tong was a co-owner of Snapterms and one of the individuals 
involved with its business operations until it closed for a “pivot” in late 2014. 
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mill contraption like in Conan the Barbarian, but with a 
bunch of lawyers chained to it.245 
Unlike the in-house examples I discuss, Snapterms did not 
attempt to actually ensure that its terms were more readable (or 
read) than the alternative. Though it hired advertising copywrit-
ers to create humorous inserts, it did not test its product’s reada-
bility, or actual reader comprehension, in a scientific way.246 
Snapterms borrowed some of its ideas for humor and explanatory 
phrases from other websites and did not attempt to tie its explana-
tions into its clients’ brands or identity.247 Thus, it is unclear 
whether outsourcing is a viable solution to the no-reading problem. 
These stories show how weak, in the end, are explanations 
that blame lawyers for failures to innovate around terms. It was 
lawyers at Kickstarter, Etsy, and Tumblr (among others) who in-
novated around contracts in their respective firms and solved 
pressing business problems. They were not uniquely risk-seeking, 
even though they did come from the same New York–based entre-
preneurial law community.248 That is, innovation and legal train-
ing are not incompatible. 
Then why did these firms innovate when others did not? I 
think the reasons are many but start with a compelling business 
logic.249 Bumble is the clearest case, though its terms are the least 
innovative. Plainly, it saw informal terms as an inexpensive 
branding play: the incongruity between legalese and informality 
was a virtuous signal that the firm was run by real people who 
could be trusted to behave well—not only with respect to what’s 
 
 245 Snapterms.com Terms of Service (Snapterms, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AHA9-REQN. 
 246 Obviously, the Snapterms team did monitor client feedback (which was positive) 
and followed reviews online at places like Reddit to be sure that the market regarded its 
terms as clear. My point is that it did not design processes to learn about the terms in a 
more rigorous way. See Interview with Hansen Tong (cited in note 244) (noting that they 
spent time improving the readability of the indemnification, representations and warran-
ties, and limitations on liability terms). 
 247 Id (explaining that Snapterms bought legal terms from LegalZoom, hired copy-
writers to insert humor, and looked to Tumblr in drafting explanatory phrases). 
 248 Indeed, Etsy, Tumblr, and Kickstarter arose from the same venture capital fund, 
Union Square Ventures, and share an outside counsel, Gunderson Dettmer. Interview 
with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). 
 249 One driver of innovation might be that the firms I studied had relatively simple 
business models and relatively low risk exposures. Match.com, by contrast, was exposed 
to a high likelihood of user-generated lawsuits, including for tortious conduct by other 
users that might be attributed to the firm. Interview with Curtis Anderson (cited in note 
214). The audience for Match’s terms and conditions was courts and regulators, not pri-
marily consumers. Id. 
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disclosed but also how the firm will behave when no one is look-
ing.250 A firm that casually refers to law as “mumbo jumbo” may 
seem like the affable type that is unlikely to sell your information 
to the nearest data aggregator. Bumble needed to send out that 
message in part because of the circumstances of its founding: its 
terms simply could not follow the standard and sterile playbook.251 
The other case examples provide a more complex set of moti-
vations. Because their customers are often also merchants, who 
often build businesses and brands on the platform, the studied 
firms have users with a vested interest in the content of the terms 
and who care greatly about the performance-shaping rules that 
they contain. Someone who buys on Etsy might also become some-
one who sells on the site: the “house rules” are addressed to an 
intensely attentive audience. As Etsy’s representative explained 
to me: “We want our members to trust us, and writing policies 
that are easy to understand is a big part of earning that trust.”252 
Similarly, Kickstarter derives its revenue by being seen as a 
trusted intermediary between a mass of internet “investors” and 
a smaller number of firms: the terms of use are the constitutive 
document, meant to be understood and read by all, as opposed to 
only those for whom deals go bad. And Tumblr users will often 
bemoan their exclusion from the community, as hard-built per-
sonal brands disappear overnight.253 
In other words, even old-fashioned, monopolistic lawyers 
write readable mass contracts (which might also be read) when 
both firms and their “customers” demand them. But when users 
(or reporters) aren’t motivated to pay attention, firms’ incentives 
to innovate are reduced, and it starts to make more sense to stick 
with the status quo.254 That is, just as in other fields, new entrants 
 
 250 For an analogous example of this sort of playing with law in trademark, see Don’t 
Say Velcro (Velcro Brand, Sept 25, 2017), online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
rRi8LptvFZY (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 251 This is in accord with Professor Victor Fleischer’s insight about “branding 
moments” in a corporation’s life, when otherwise sterile forms (like a charter) can further 
its brand. Fleischer, 12 Harv Negotiation L Rev at 151–53 (cited in note 217); Victor 
Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 Mich 
L Rev 1581, 1600, 1628 (2006) (explaining that branding moments are most important 
early in a company’s life). 
 252 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158). 
 253 See Gavia Baker-Whitelaw, Tumblr Users Panic as Accounts Are Deleted for 
Copyright Violations (The Daily Dot, Feb 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CUP5-S25Q. 
 254 See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese”, 77 Chi Kent L Rev 59, 
78–80 (2001) (highlighting the challenges of changing terms in contracts); Clayton P. 
Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 BU L Rev 813, 819 (1998) (contrasting the 
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and outsiders innovate. Thus, we can see innovation that makes 
terms more communicative (or at least seem to be more commu-
nicative) as akin to innovation in the terms themselves: they re-
sult from learning, over time, about the firm’s market position 
and the returns that it will reap from change.255 
Innovation is expensive; Etsy’s lawyers noted that “cost sen-
sitivity” matters here.256 Indeed, as Bajwa lamented, the revision 
process took six months, much of it on nights and weekends 
carved out from the day-to-day work of being a lawyer for a busy 
and growing firm.257 For most general counsel at most firms, ren-
ovating the terms and conditions to make sure that terms that 
command obedience are understandable simply isn’t high on the 
priority list. Bajwa continued: 
Now that I’m GC at a new and much younger startup, when 
I look at my priorities right now with much fewer resources 
and a company that is in a much different position, I can’t 
justify devoting time to focusing on the terms of service 
here. . . . Our user base is not interested [in the same way as 
Etsy’s]. If they are legally sound that is fine for now.258 
This suggests that the market for terms like those I describe 
might be constrained. Similarly, Kickstarter’s Rosenn pointed out 
that existing terms “get the job done” by mitigating risk. In the 
hurly burly of the day, with competing demands on a general 
counsel’s time, marginally improving the terms is usually cost 
prohibitive: it’s a “challenging” task to “force yourself outside of 
the lawyer lens and think about language and policies in a more 
human way.”259 
More generally, general counsel argue that the time spent on 
terms is quite difficult to justify in a world in which much of what 
must be contained in terms of use is mandated by law or com-
pelled by solving transnational compliance problems. According 
 
lack of contract innovation with innovation in technology); Henry T. Greely, Contracts as 
Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 Vand L 
Rev 133, 168 (1989) (comparing the difficulty of innovation in standardized contract terms 
to trying to change the dominant QWERTY keyboard layout). 
 255 Davis, 88 NYU L Rev at 108 (cited in note 106) (explaining that innovation results 
from “learning-by-doing”). 
 256 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 2:17 pm (cited in note 102). 
 257 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). 
 258 Id. See also Gomulkiewicz, 12 Geo Mason L Rev at 701 (cited in note 86) (describ-
ing “[l]ack of leadership by [ ] senior management” as a barrier to innovative contract 
drafting). 
 259 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101). 
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to lawyers at the IAC Group (which owns or owned Ask.com, 
Match.com, Vimeo, and other new economy firms), terms of use 
are hard to read and complex because they must be: lawyers are 
trying to solve worldwide compliance issues, responding to evolv-
ing business goals and technical modalities, while permitting 
firms maximum flexibility to maneuver in fields like privacy. 
Given that “the working assumption is that no one is reading the 
TOS,” it would be a Sisyphean task to spend significant efforts to 
encourage readership of documents that must, by their nature, be 
hideously complex.260 Michael Cheah, Vimeo’s general counsel, la-
mented: “You can do as much education as you want on terms, 
people aren’t going to sit down and read them.”261 
This account, then, suggests that the barrier to innovation 
isn’t lawyers’ training or risk aversion—or at least not primarily 
those factors. Rather, firms innovate and create terms that look 
functional when it is in their interest to do so. The set of cases in 
which those conditions hold is not zero, but it might be quite 
small. 
C. Relational Contracts of Adhesion 
With this account of why and when precatory terms work in 
hand, we can turn our attention to considering how our case stud-
ies fit in the existing taxonomy of contract law and practice. To 
wildly oversimplify, that taxonomy can be thought of as starting 
with the nineteenth century’s classical contract: a fully negotiated 
contract between equally situated individuals. From that root 
came two great branches. The first is the modern commercial con-
tract, marked by negotiation ex ante (at least some of the time), 
and reputationally determined performance goals and norms.262 
Such contracts are intended to be read and to govern behavior 
while the parties’ relationship remains intact. 
The second branch is the classic consumer contract of adhe-
sion.263 Consumer contracts are not negotiated ex ante, are offered 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and (as I describe) function as dis-
cretionary options.264 The drafters of such contracts are aware 
 
 260 Interview with Ed Ferguson and Michael Cheah (cited in note 83). 
 261 Id. 
 262 See text accompanying notes 51–53. 
 263 For an influential analysis of this type of contract, see Friedrich Kessler, Contracts 
of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum L Rev 629, 631–32 
(1943) (describing the rise of consumer contracts of adhesion). 
 264 See text accompanying notes 69–70. 
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that their terms will be unread by their mass adherents. The au-
dience is ex post—largely for courts and secondarily for aggrieved 
consumers. 
One way to think about the case studies in this Article is that 
they have taken on attributes of both traditional consumer and 
commercial contracts. This can be seen along a number of dimen-
sions, as the following table illustrates: 
TABLE 1:  CONTRACT ATTRIBUTES 
 Consumer 
Contracts 
Commercial 
Contracts 
Platform Case 
Studies 
Individually 
negotiated or 
adhesive 
Adhesive Negotiated Some informal 
drafting but 
then deployed 
adhesively 
Number of 
counterparties 
Millions A handful Millions 
Duration Largely one-off 
purchases 
Relationship Relationship 
Reading ex-
pected? 
No Yes Yes 
Merchants or 
Consumers 
Merchants Both Both 
How are terms 
usually en-
forced? 
Exclusion and ex 
post litigation 
defenses 
Reputational 
markets à self-
policing 
Exclusion and 
internalization 
Sharing of 
benefits and 
burdens 
No Yes Yes (in theory) 
 
These categories are largely self-explanatory with a few 
exceptions: 
• Merchants or consumers: Categorizing platform counter-
parties as consumers or merchants may be one of the key legal 
and political questions of the digital age. It doesn’t seem fair to 
conclude that Etsy’s 1.9 million sellers265 (for example) are all 
“merchants” in the same way that firms in traditional consumer 
contracts are. For one, they may be buyers and sellers of items 
 
 265 See About Etsy (Etsy, Sept 31, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/LE7X-KW9U (de-
scribing 1.9 million “active sellers” on the platform). 
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simultaneously, and for another, they may be hobbyists or indi-
viduals earning their livelihood. This is even truer for Tumblr, 
which attracts both professionals and those who simply seek to 
express themselves. Now, obviously, heavy users on each site are 
probably more like traditional merchants than they are like one-
off consumers, but it’s not at all clear that such users were the 
exclusive audience for the revised tone and feel of terms that I 
discuss. 
• How are terms enforced: Like ordinary consumer contracts, 
platform terms work in part through exclusion: users are thrown 
off sites for bad behavior, and terms (filtered through moderators 
and complaint systems) enable those sanctions to proceed 
smoothly. But unlike consumer contracts, the evidence I adduce 
suggests that platform contracts also succeed because at least 
some of their adherents read them, talk about them, and use them 
in dealing with one another. That is, the terms become a part of 
the reputational market on the platform. 
• Sharing of benefit and burdens: This is a shorthand way of 
asking how one-sided the contracts are: Do they grasp each ad-
vantage for the drafting party, or do the mass counterparties re-
tain sufficient negotiating power to make the resulting exchanges 
moderately “fair”? Here, it is difficult to know with precision. I 
show that firms have forgone some opportunities to exculpate 
liability and control litigation risk. At the same time, the firms do 
share some of the benefits of the platform with their users, in that 
they permit users to monetize their property and do not take own-
ership in it. Whether platform firms generally are largely benign 
is outside the scope of this Article, but I return later to the ques-
tion of just how “fair” their contracts in fact are.266 
What to make of this mix? A word that came up repeatedly 
in my conversations with the lawyers who drafted these contracts 
was relationship. The contracts were intended to embody trust 
between the firm and its users, to demonstrate that the terms 
were aligned with the firms’ long-term mission, and to encourage 
users to continue to participate in the platform.267 The firms had 
no desire to sue any of their users for violations of the terms. At 
most, they wished to weed out from their sites users who were 
disruptive to the platform’s functioning, but otherwise they hoped 
 
 266 See notes 283–86 and accompanying text. 
 267 For an example of a similar practice, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure 
and the New Economy, 8 I/S: J L & Pol Info Socy 1, 46–47 (2012) (reporting that the CBS 
general counsel wanted lawyers who could design a “relational structure”). 
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to create a set of rules that would be self-policing.268 This reads, 
in many ways, like an attempt to create a classic relational con-
tract, counterpoised to the ordinary discrete consumer contract.269 
As with the traditional description of relational contracting, 
the governing contracts here are “not designed to create incen-
tives for performance and breach primarily through the prospect 
of court-imposed monetary damages.”270 Performance is rather 
governed largely by users internalizing a set of rules created 
through brand alignment, informality, and interpersonal norms 
of reciprocity and fairness (thus, Bumble says, “[W]e’ve worked 
hard on our creation, so scraping or replicating any part of the 
App without our prior consent is expressly prohibited”).271 As 
Professor Oliver Hart has explained, reciprocity is a strong norm 
when the participants clearly understand what they are getting 
and giving:272 Etsy’s need to clarify the intellectual property rights 
that its platform takes (or doesn’t) thus was a crucial part of its 
reform process. 
When soft norms fail, even in relational contracting systems, 
firms retain the ability to use a heavier hand. Here, our case 
study firms start their sanctions with rating-based complaint sys-
tems, escalate to suasion by site moderators, and finally exclude 
bad users from the marketplace entirely. But those systems can 
be overstrained: as the case studies show, firms innovated here in 
part because their customer service representatives needed a 
break from noncompliant users, who needed to be better con-
vinced that they were in a relationship of trust and reciprocity. In 
this way, we can see the relational contracts here as solving a 
 
 268 An analogy is to online dispute resolution systems, like that of Wikipedia, which 
seek to weed out problematic users but otherwise motivate productive editors to continue 
to dispute (and generate content for the platform). See David A. Hoffman and Salil K. 
Mehra, Wikitruth through Wikiorder, 59 Emory L J 151, 170–74 (2009) (exploring 
Wikipedia’s dispute resolution system). 
 269 For an analysis of this distinction, see Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract: An 
Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations 10 (Yale 1980) (distinguishing discrete contracts 
from relational ones). For an early, aspirational version of relational contracting in digital 
spaces, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually Assured Protection: Toward Development of 
Relational Internet Data Security and Privacy Contracting Norms, in Anupam Chander, 
Lauren Gelman, and Margaret Jane Radin, eds, Securing Privacy in the Internet Age 73, 81–
82 (Stanford 2008). But see Bar-Gill and Davis, 84 S Cal L Rev at 35 (cited in note 7) (noting 
that consumer contracts are sometimes designed to govern long-term relationships). 
 270 Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network 
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J Legal Analysis 561, 562 (2015). 
 271 Bumble Terms and Conditions (cited in note 111). 
 272 See Oliver Hart, Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the 
Firm, 75 Economica 404, 407 (2008). 
1456 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1395 
 
business problem: they needed to keep users engaged, on task, 
and willing to contribute to a larger platform economy. 
But platform users aren’t ordinary relational contracting 
counterparties.273 Etsy and Tumblr’s creators are heterogeneous 
and myriad: ordinary norms and reputational sanctions alone can 
only weakly police behavior.274 From the case studies, it seems 
clear that one important way that these contracting systems work 
is through consumer service teams, who use the terms themselves 
to remind users of the rules. This is not the traditional relational 
contracting setting in which the rules are (at best) the beginning 
of the conversation.275 Platform sites are in a repeated, socially 
rich, virtual relationship with each of their users.276 
Moreover, the contracts here, though focus-grouped ex ante, 
are formally adhesive: individual Etsy or Kickstarter users 
simply cannot negotiate their own deals with each other or with 
the site. That’s true in part because terms of use are mass agree-
ments, binding not hundreds on a local or regional bourse but mil-
lions, worldwide, on the internet. It would be inconceivable for 
platform firms to come to separate deals with each of their users, 
or even talk about the deals in detail with a fraction of them. Con-
ventionally, “[c]ontracts of adhesion and relational contracts are 
in some ways opposite to each other,”277 making even the term 
“relational contracts of adhesion” a difficult one. 
 
 273 For analyses of typical relational contracting counterparties, see Amy J. Schmitz, 
Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 Pepperdine L Rev 279, 
290–300 (2012) (describing the characteristics of consumers); Bernstein, 99 Mich L Rev at 
1762–64 (cited in note 53) (describing relational contract relationships in the cotton indus-
try); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Stud 115, 130–32 (1992) (same, in the diamond indus-
try); Macaulay, 28 Am Sociological Rev at 65–67 (cited in note 53). 
 274 See Bernstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 140 (cited in note 273) (explaining that reputa-
tional bonds are generally effective only in homogeneous groups). 
 275 For more on the role of enforceability (however defined), see Andrew A. Schwartz, 
Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 Yale J Reg 313, 324–26 
(2011) (arguing that legal enforceability is necessary for a contract to have value and that 
relational contracts are a viable alternative to legal enforceability only if the parties have 
a personal, long-term relationship). 
 276 See Ronald J. Mann and Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet 
Retail Contracting, 108 Colum L Rev 984, 1011 (2008) (“Although many of the customers are 
repeat customers, there is by definition almost no opportunity online for the kind of personal 
interaction that characterizes relational contracting as it is commonly understood.”); F. Scott 
Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to 
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 Emory L J 327, 356 (2006) (noting that 
relational contracting is effective “within homogeneous communities”). 
 277 Aditi Bagchi, Parallel Contract, 75 U Pitt L Rev 139, 142 (2013). 
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Thus, Etsy, Tumblr, and Kickstarter (and to a lesser extent, 
Airbnb) may illustrate a genuinely novel contracting form. Their 
end-user contracting framework is designed to build on an exist-
ing relationship and generate trust by the users toward the firm 
and toward each other. But it does so on a massive scale through 
terms of use that are embedded into the firm’s existing trade 
dress. Users can participate in the terms’ creation, or at least are 
invited to do so in a way that makes them feel included. But the 
terms themselves are nonnegotiable and are enforced against the 
users not by the threat of suit but by exclusion from the market. 
The case study contracts aren’t just accomplishing the ordinary 
goals of conveying information and setting up rules. They are do-
ing that, but they are also marketing materials, demonstrating 
values the firms think are useful—that is, we’re progressive, non-
conformist, funny, hip, young, and above all, not evil. 
D. The Future of Contract Regulation (and Regulation by 
Contract) 
Authors selling normative prescriptions standing on a lim-
ited number of case studies should be distrusted. This Section, 
cognizant of the strength of the evidence on which it rests, will 
make two observations and then pose a series of hopefully orien-
tating questions about the nature of future research into the func-
tioning of mass contracts. 
First, an implicit premise of this Article is that contract the-
orists should treat precatory terms and exculpatory terms as dis-
tinct objects of study. To date, they have not, all but ignoring prec-
atory terms.278 But if contract (particularly consumer contract) 
theory is to become realistic, we ought to revisit our accounts of 
contracting to deal with the fact that many terms in adhesive 
mass-market contracts purport to extend the performance obliga-
tion beyond the point of purchase, and yet are obviously not in-
tended to have legal force. 
The evidence I adduce tends to discredit accounts that deem 
these terms to be inert as a product of a monopolistic bar’s failure 
to innovate. Precatory terms do have multiple functions. The 
most obvious one—options to enable the firm to manage unruly 
users—is underdeveloped in the literature, which generally fo-
cuses on bad behavior by firms, not their customers. But they 
 
 278 Selection plays a role here—only exculpatory terms are typically tested in court, 
leading to decisions that are the grist for law review treatments. 
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also, it seems, can help to build firms’ brands and can even help 
the firms to coordinate user behavior and keep users engaged 
with the platform. The degree to which the latter functions have 
wide appeal is highly debatable: this Article simply can tell us 
that some firms, some of the time, justify costly innovation with 
precisely this claim to utility. 
Second, the case studies suggest that scholars might have 
missed a potential way that disclosure could be made functional. 
When trying to solve the problem of aversive, unread, exculpatory 
terms, many modern thinkers have pushed a solution designed to 
remedy cognitive problems of information overload.279 For 
example, some advocate for smart disclosure mandates like warn-
ing boxes that stand out with unexpected terms,280 or graphical 
warning labels for terms that are particularly unfair.281 The con-
sumer contract problem is conceived of as a problem of mandating 
the precisely right disclosures because it is assumed that firms 
always lack incentives to encourage readership. 
The examples of success that I provide here suggest the pos-
sible futility of even sophisticated disclosure regimes.282 Each of 
the case studies suggests that terms exhort when they are 
trusted, built from the ground up with buy-in from the firm’s 
users, and fit with the brand. Or to put it differently, the case 
studies might be thought of as a market test of the question of 
how to encourage mass readership. Firms selected brands over 
labels. Scholars might follow this path (through experiments or 
otherwise) to see if informality and brand alignment increase 
comprehension and use of terms. 
This naturally leads to some potential research questions 
about relational contracts of adhesion. There is much we do not 
know. Are Etsy’s house rules better than eBay’s? Are Airbnb’s 
better than Hyatt’s? Tumblr’s than Instagram’s? In what way? 
 
 279 See, for example, Jonathan A. Obar and Anne Oeldorf-Hirsh, The Biggest Lie on 
the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social 
Networking Services *23 (TPRC Working Paper, Sept 23, 2017), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/K9KL-UGEH (finding that readers ignored terms when joining a networking 
site, in part because of “information overload”). 
 280 See Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L Rev at 553 (cited in note 1). 
 281 For a skeptical discussion, see Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More than 
You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 135–37 (Princeton 2014) (dis-
cussing the failure of nutrition labels and people’s inability to understand them). 
 282 See id at 125 (“Simplicity . . . is usually in tension with full disclosure.”). 
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These are questions that are difficult to get a handle on.283 As 
Professor Calo and Alex Rosenblat have pointed out, we should 
be cautious before taking the sharing economy firms at their mis-
sion statements.284 These firms are motivated to extract value 
from users in whatever ways are at hand: contracts that give with 
one hand may take away with another in ways invisible to exter-
nal observers. I can’t conclusively determine whether the con-
tracts I identify, which are in some ways much friendlier to users 
than is the norm, are being undermined through conduct behind 
the scenes. Have they created a real relationship of cooperation 
and trust (the firms’ story) or merely perpetuated a narrative of 
trust that enables the firms to profit from customers who have 
mistakenly concluded that they are merchants rather than the 
products being sold? This is a question worth further detailed 
study.285 
Relatedly, the theory I lay out is highly reliant on stories told 
by particular firms’ lawyers, who wrote the contracts in question, 
spent time justifying them to other stakeholders, and clearly have 
an interest in being portrayed as both progressive and innovative. 
Indeed, I gave the lawyers permission to read and edit their 
quoted comments before this Article’s circulation, and any direct 
quotes they believed reflected badly on them would not have sur-
vived such an inquiry. It is interesting, and perhaps telling, that 
none of the general counsel I spoke to provided hard data about 
readership rates or designed systems to rigorously evaluate their 
modified terms’ behavioral effects.286 That is not to say that the 
lawyers I spoke to were deceiving (me or themselves). Rather, to 
 
 283 Similarly difficult to determine is how courts ought to fold the design features of 
such contracts into their explicit terms. See Hartzog, 60 Am U L Rev at 1653–61 (cited in 
note 24) (arguing for courts to consider online contract terms’ design when evaluating 
them). 
 284 Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1627–28 (cited in note 8) (“The sharing 
economy seems poised to do a great deal of taking—extracting more and more value 
from participants while continuing to enjoy the veneer of a disruptive, socially minded 
enterprise.”). 
 285 See generally, for example, Mark Fenster, Coolhunting the Law, 12 Harv 
Negotiation L Rev 157 (2007) (analyzing lawyers’ roles in crafting companies’ brands). 
 286 Even if data on readership rates were not illuminating, certainly such firms could 
(and maybe do) have information about customer service load. See, for example, Mathew 
Patterson, How Top Customer Service Teams Measure Performance (HelpScout), archived 
at http://perma.cc/AU98-VQHL (describing a tool that provides real-time metrics on cus-
tomer service activity). 
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the extent that part of the story I tell is one of contract as mar-
keting, we ought to be wary of taking more grand claims of behav-
ioral influence at face value. 
If we were to become convinced that relational contracts of 
adhesion were influencing users to read and use their contracts, 
further qualitative and quantitative study might suggest the lim-
its of users’ acquiescence to the regulatory regime: Is buy-in 
stronger with those who make more money on the site? Who have 
been there longer? Who commented on the terms in their draft-
ing? The apparent reticence of firms like Airbnb to ask probing 
questions of their users suggests that not all firms will be equally 
able to affect behavior or want to learn about it. Similarly, to what 
extent is success here a product of rarity: If all firms’ terms looked 
as cute as Etsy’s, would users become numb? 
Obviously, only a few firms have user terms that look any-
thing like the ones I’ve studied. Why is that? Are relational con-
tracts of adhesion limited to circumstances in which users are 
also merchants? To firms pressed on the problem when they were 
small enough to care but big enough to invest? To firms born in 
New York City? Near Union Square? A research project that 
looked at those firms that did not innovate, though they had the 
opportunity to do so, might help to provide clarity on these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Channeling user behavior is one of the mission-critical tasks 
in the sharing economy. Firms have spent enormous energy on 
that project, mostly in the form of behavioral nudges287 and soft-
ware like Digital Rights Management.288 Technological evange-
lists are even starting to promise that “smart contracts” based on 
decentralized ledger technology—a set of tools and protocols that 
exchange and verify data without centralized intermediaries—
can solve certain problems in the consumer space.289 
 
 287 See Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1650–54 (cited in note 8) (explaining 
how firms can “nudge” consumers to behave in ways beneficial to the firm). 
 288 Digital rights management (DRM) allows parties to control access to information 
and to track and monitor content. Rebecca Wexler, The Private Life of DRM: Lessons on 
Privacy from the Copyright Enforcement Debates, 17 Yale J L & Tech 368, 373 (2015). In 
Europe, the Pirate Party system was built on opposition to DRM technologies. See id at 
379–81 (describing the Pirate Party’s foundational orientation against DRM restrictions); 
Rub, 103 Va L Rev at 1215–16 (cited in note 13) (exploring DRM as an alternative to con-
tractual control). 
 289 See Alexander Savalyev, Contract Law 2.0: Smart Contracts as the Beginning of 
the End of Classic Contracts Law, 26 Info & Communications Tech L 116, 123 (2017) (“But 
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Notwithstanding these sophisticated techniques, firms con-
tinue to deploy benumbing terms of use to users who do not read 
them.290 Those terms continue to purport to govern user behavior. 
Their regulations can be bizarre; for example, the fine print “tells” 
you not to drive Beyoncé home from a concert in your Zipcar or 
trade on insider tips when registering for your honeymoon.291 In-
deed, so odd does the project of governing the public with contract 
terms seem that no one has written carefully about it. Precatory 
and executory terms are seen as part of the same story of uncre-
ative exploitation. 
It’s dangerous to generalize from case studies, let alone ones 
that valorize their subjects. This Article can merely claim that not 
all mass-market contracts look the same, and they might not 
function identically, either. Some might be changing user behav-
ior by drawing on practices (of reciprocity, informality, and trust) 
traditionally sourced to individualized, negotiated, off-line deals. 
The challenge going forward is to understand better what role the 
law and legal institutions play in creating innovation around such 
relational contracts of adhesion. 
 
in contrast to classic contract where trust is put in the personality of the other party to 
the contract, in Smart contracts such trust is put in the computer algorithm standing be-
hind the agreement.”); Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer 
Protection, 71 Wash & Lee L Rev Online 35, 38 (2014) (defining smart contracts as “auto-
mated programs that transfer digital assets”). 
 290 Indeed, some firms may be attempting to discriminate in favor of the rare borrow-
ers who read terms, who (at least according to press reports) may be better credit risks. 
See Steve Lohr, Banking Start-Ups Adopt New Tools for Lending (NY Times, Jan 18, 
2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/technology/banking-start-ups-adopt 
-new-tools-for-lending.html (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing 
Earnest, a lending firm that generates risk profiles for borrowers based in part on how 
long they spend reading the online terms and conditions of the loan). 
 291 Users of Honeyfund, a honeymoon crowdfunding site, are prohibited from “posting, 
providing, transmitting, or otherwise making available any information which violates 
regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, or that of any se-
curities exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange.” Terms of Use (Honeyfund, Nov 
11, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/MRP3-9A3S. 
